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1 
Wayfair: Its Implications and Missed Opportunities 
Professor Richard D. Pomp* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This Article has its roots in a lone concurrence by Justice Kennedy in 
Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl,1 a concurrence having nothing to do with 
the merits of that case. Nonetheless, that concurrence went viral, leading to 
the most important sales tax case in over a quarter-century: South Dakota 
v. Wayfair, Inc.2 Because of the cataclysmic impact of Kennedy’s 
concurrence and its preview of the issues in this Article, it is worth 
quoting at length: 
Almost half a century ago, this Court determined that, under its 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, States cannot require a business to 
collect use taxes—which are the equivalent of sales taxes for out-of-
state purchases—if the business does not have a physical presence 
in the State. Use taxes are still due, but under Bellas Hess3 they 
must be collected from and paid by the customer, not the out-of-
state seller. 
Twenty-five years later, the Court relied on stare decisis to reaffirm 
the physical presence requirement and to reject attempts to require a 
mail-order business to collect and pay use taxes.4 This was despite 
the fact that under the more recent and refined test elaborated in 
 
* . Alva P. Loiselle Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law School. 
1. 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015). In Direct Marketing, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Tax 
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012), did not bar the federal courts from hearing challenges to 
Colorado’s statute requiring out-of-state retailers to notify their customers of their sales and use tax 
requirement, and to report tax-related information to their customers and to the State. The Court 
remanded the case, which the State later won, 814 F. 3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016), and “express[ed] no 
view on the merits.” Id. at 1134. Justice Kennedy, however, took the opportunity to write separately to 
critique Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), discussed at length infra Part II.A, and to 
invite a challenge to that case by the states. The fact that Kennedy’s concurrence had nothing to do 
with the merits of the case may explain why no one joined him. Another explanation is that in addition 
to Kennedy, only Justices Scalia and Thomas were on the Court when Quill was decided, leaving six 
justices who might have had no familiarity with Quill and who might have felt uncomfortable joining 
the concurrence. 
2. 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
3. [Ed. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967), discussed infra 
Part II.] 
4. [Ed. Eight of the nine justices in Quill reaffirmed Bellas Hess on principles of stare decisis.] 
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Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,5 “contemporary Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result” as the Court 
had reached in Bellas Hess. In other words, the Quill majority 
acknowledged the prospect that its conclusion was wrong when the 
case was decided. Still, the Court determined vendors who had no 
physical presence in a State did not have the “substantial nexus with 
the taxing state” necessary to impose tax-collection duties under the 
Commerce Clause. Three Justices concurred in the judgment, 
stating their votes to uphold the rule of Bellas Hess were based on 
stare decisis alone. This further underscores the tenuous nature of 
that holding—a holding now inflicting extreme harm and unfairness 
on the States.  
In Quill, the Court should have taken the opportunity to reevaluate 
Bellas Hess not only in light of Complete Auto but also in view of 
the dramatic technological and social changes that had taken place 
in our increasingly interconnected economy. There is a powerful 
case to be made that a retailer doing extensive business within a 
State has a sufficiently “substantial nexus” to justify imposing some 
minor tax-collection duty, even if that business is done through mail 
or the Internet. After all, “interstate commerce may be required to 
pay its fair share of state taxes.” This argument has grown stronger, 
and the cause more urgent, with time. . . 
. . .  
The Internet has caused far-reaching systemic and structural 
changes in the economy, and, indeed, in many other societal 
dimensions. Although online businesses may not have a physical 
presence in some States, the Web has, in many ways, brought the 
average American closer to most major retailers. A connection to a 
shopper’s favorite store is a click away—regardless of how close or 
far the nearest storefront. Today buyers have almost instant access 
to most retailers via cell phones, tablets, and laptops. As a result, a 
business may be present in a State in a meaningful way without that 
presence being physical in the traditional sense of the term. 
 
5. [Ed. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), discussed infra Part II.] 
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Given these changes in technology and consumer sophistication, it 
is unwise to delay any longer a reconsideration of the Court’s 
holding in Quill. A case questionable even when decided, Quill now 
harms States to a degree far greater than could have been anticipated 
earlier. It should be left in place only if a powerful showing can be 
made that its rationale is still correct. 
The legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to 
reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess.6 
 
I. SOUTH DAKOTA V. WAYFAIR, INC.: OVERVIEW 
 
A. The Majority 
 
In 2016, South Dakota accepted Justice Kennedy’s invitation to 
challenge Quill and Bellas Hess. The State passed S. 106, “to provide for 
the collection of sales taxes7 from certain remote sellers . . . and to declare 
an emergency.”8 It adopted a statute requiring out-of-state sellers to collect 
and remit sales tax “as if the seller had a physical presence in the State.”9 
The Act covers only sellers that, on an annual basis, deliver more than 
$100,000 of goods or services into the State or engage in 200 or more 
separate transactions for the delivery of goods or services into the State.10 
Significantly, the Act does not apply retroactively.11 
In 2017, Wayfair, Inc., Overstock.com, Inc., and Newegg, Inc. were 
merchants with no employees or real estate in South Dakota. Wayfair, Inc. 
had net revenues of over $4.7 billion. Overstock.com, Inc. had net 
revenues of over $1.7 billion.12 Each of these companies shipped its goods 
 
6. Direct Marketing, 814 F. 3d at 1134 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
7. For a discussion of why a state should draft its statute to provide for the collection of use taxes 
rather than sales taxes, see infra Part VII.C.5. 
8. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088. “Seldom has a concurring opinion signed by a lone Justice 
prompted a state to officially declare an emergency.” Student Comment, Article I – Stare Decisis for 
Constitutional Default Rules – Dormant Commerce Clause – South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 132 
HARV. L. REV. 277, 278 (2018). The emergency declaration was to give the law immediate effect and 
an expedited review. Id. 
9. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089.  
10. Id. For a discussion of the use of thresholds, see infra Part VII.C. 
11. Id.; see infra note 52. 
12.  Id. For some unexplained reason, the Court does not disclose Newegg’s net revenues. 
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directly to purchasers throughout the United States, including South 
Dakota. Each easily met the minimum sales or transactions requirement of 
the Act, but none collected South Dakota sales tax.13 
Pursuant to the Act’s provisions for expeditious judicial review,14 South 
Dakota filed a declaratory judgment action in state court, seeking a 
declaration that the Act was valid and applicable to the three vendors. It 
also sought an injunction requiring the three internet vendors to register 
for licenses to collect and remit sales tax. The vendors moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that the Act was unconstitutional.15  
South Dakota conceded that the Act could not survive under Bellas 
Hess and Quill but asserted the importance, indeed the necessity, of asking 
the Supreme Court to review those earlier decisions in light of current 
economic realities. The trial court granted summary judgment to the 
vendors.16 
The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. “However persuasive the 
State’s arguments on the merits of revisiting the issue, Quill has not been 
overruled [and] remains the controlling precedent on the issue of 
Commerce Clause limitations on interstate collection of sales and use 
taxes.”17  
In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, unsurprisingly given that it 
was his concurrence in Direct Marketing that inspired the South Dakota 
statute, the Court reversed. Writing for a five person majority, Justice 
Kennedy overturned Bellas Hess’s18 and Quill’s physical presence rule, 
finding that it was unsound and incorrect, “flawed on its own terms,”19 
“arbitrary, formalistic,”20 “anachronistic,”21 “unfair and unjust”22 to the 
 
13. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089. 
14. See Student Comment, supra note 8. 
15. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089. The State successfully opposed the vendors’ attempt to move the 
case to the federal courts. South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (D.S.D. 2017). Compare 
supra note 1. 
16. Id. 
17. State v. Wayfair Inc., 901 N. W. 2d 754, 761 (S.D. 2017). 
18. Although Bellas Hess does not actually use the phrase “physical presence,” it had come to be 
interpreted as imposing that requirement. 
19. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 2086. 
22. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/7
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states and local retailers.23 Physical presence was not a “necessary 
interpretation”24 of substantial nexus, and was “the sort of arbitrary, 
formalistic [rule] that the Court’s modern commerce clause precedents 
disavow in favor of a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and 
effects.”25 It was a “poor proxy for the compliance costs faced by 
companies that do business in multiple States.”26 It creates rather than 
eliminates market distortions.27 The rule had long been criticized28 as 
providing out-of-state sellers an advantage that in each year becomes 
further removed from economic reality29 and results in significant revenue 
losses to the States. The Court held that the rule was an incorrect 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, both as first formulated and as 
applied today and overruled both Quill and Bellas Hess.30 
 
23. The Court noted that Quill “treats economically identical actors differently, and for arbitrary 
reasons.” Id. at 2094. 
24. Id. at 2092. 
25. Id. at 2085 (internal citation omitted). The “‘dramatic technological and social changes’ of our 
‘increasingly interconnected economy’ mean that buyers are ‘closer to most major retailers’ than ever 
before—‘regardless of how close or far the nearest storefront. Between targeted advertising and instant 
access to most consumers via any internet-enabled device, ‘a business may be present in a State in a 
meaningful way without’ that presence ‘being physical in the traditional sense of the term.’ A virtual 
showroom can show far more inventory, in far more detail, and with greater opportunities for 
consumer and seller interaction than might be possible for local stores. Yet the continuous and 
pervasive virtual presence of retailers today is, under Quill, simply irrelevant. This Court should not 
maintain a rule that ignores these substantial virtual connections to the state.” Id. at 2095 (internal 
citations omitted). 
26. Id. at 2093. 
27. Id. at 2085. Local businesses are at a disadvantage because remote sellers can offer lower 
prices; while the consumer owes the use tax, which should neutralize the tax costs of shopping on-line 
and shopping locally, the use tax is typically not paid on internet purchases. Id. at 2088. 
28. See RICHARD D. POMP, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 9-82-83 (9th ed., 2019) (collecting 
articles critical of Quill). 
29. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092.  
Modern e-commerce does not align analytically with a test that relies on the sort of physical 
presence defined in Quill. In a footnote, Quill rejected the argument that ‘title to “a few 
floppy diskettes” present in a State’ was sufficient to constitute a ‘substantial nexus’ . . . [b]ut 
it is not clear why a single employee or a single warehouse should create a substantial nexus 
while ‘physical’ aspects of pervasive modern technology should not. For example, a company 
with a website accessible in South Dakota may be said to have a physical presence in the 
State via the customers’ computers. A website may leave cookies saved to the customers’ 
hard drives, or customers may download the company’s app onto their phones. Or a company 
may lease data storage that is permanently, or even occasionally, located in South Dakota.  
Id. at 2095. 
30. Id. at 2097. 
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In addition, the Court viewed the rule as conflicting with principles of 
state sovereignty. The “physical presence rule . . . is not just a technical 
legal problem—it is an extraordinary imposition by the judiciary on the 
States’ authority to collect taxes and perform critical public functions.”31 It 
“intrudes on State’s reasonable choices in enacting their tax systems.”32 “If 
it becomes apparent that the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions prohibit 
the States from exercising their lawful sovereign powers in our federal 
system, the Court should be vigilant in correcting the error.”33 
The majority refused to apply principles of stare decisis and affirm the 
physical presence rule on the basis of Bellas Hess and Quill.34 True, Quill 
relied on stare decisis principles to protect the reliance interests of the 
remote vendors on Bellas Hess.35 In Wayfair, however, the Court declared 
that these principles can no longer support the Court’s prohibition of a 
valid exercise of the States’ sovereign power. Principles of stare decisis 
are not immutable.36 Because Quill’s physical presence rule was no longer 
a clear or easily applicable standard, reliance arguments were misplaced.37 
“Attempts to apply the physical presence rule to online retail sales are 
proving unworkable. States are already confronting the complexities of 
defining physical presence in the Cyber Age.”38 
 
31. Id. at 2095. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 2096. Calhoun and Kolarik raise the possibility that the Court may be “reevaluating the 
role of the judiciary in reviewing state tax laws and that it intends to give substantial deference to state 
tax regimes. It may also be that the Court is indirectly hinting to Congress that it expects congressional 
action in the field and intends to limit its forays into SALT.” Jaye Calhoun & William J. Kolarik II, 
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Historic Decision in Wayfair, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 125 (2018). 
34. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096. 
35. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992). 
36. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096. 
37. Id. at 2098. 
38. Id. at 2097.  
For example, Massachusetts proposed a regulation that would have defined physical presence 
to include making apps available to be downloaded by in-state residents and placing cookies 
on in-state residents’ web browsers. Ohio recently adopted a similar standard. Some States 
have enacted so-called ‘click through’ nexus statutes, which define nexus to include out-of-
state sellers that contract with in-state residents who refer customers for compensation. Others 
still, like Colorado, have imposed notice and reporting requirements on out-of-state retailers 
that fall just short of actually collecting and remitting the tax. 
Id. at 2097-98 (internal citations omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/7
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“Stare decisis accommodates only ‘legitimate reliance interest[s].’”39 
“Quill has come to serve as a judicially created tax shelter for businesses 
that decide to limit their physical presence and still sell their goods and 
services to a State’s consumers—something that has become easier and 
more prevalent as technology has advanced.”40 “[C]onstitutional right[s]” 
are not based “on the practical opportunities for tax avoidance.”41 
The majority’s discussion of stare decisis responded to the dissent’s 
citing Quill, which “emphasized that the decision to hew to the physical-
presence rule on stare decisis grounds was ‘made easier by the fact that the 
underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualified to 
resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve.’”42 
Accordingly, the dissent argued that the Court need not overrule Bella 
Hess or Quill, even if they were wrongly decided.43 The majority rejected 
this reasoning: 
 
If it becomes apparent that the United States Supreme Court’s 
Commerce Clause decisions prohibit the States from exercising 
their lawful sovereign powers in our federal system, the Court 
should be vigilant in correcting the error. While it can be conceded 
that Congress has the authority to change the physical presence rule, 
Congress cannot change the constitutional default rule. It is 
inconsistent with the Court’s proper role to ask Congress to address 
a false constitutional premise of the Court’s own creation. Courts 
have acted as the front line of review in this limited sphere; and 
hence it is important that their principles be accurate and logical, 
whether or not Congress can or will act in response.44 
 
 Refusing to leave a remedy to Congress, the Court had to decide what 
 
39. Id. at 2098 (alteration in original). Describing the remote vendors’ reliance interests as 
“illegitimate” seems inconsistent with the Court’s endorsement of the South Dakota statute applying 
only prospectively. 
40. Id. at 2094. 
41. Id. at 2098.  
42. Id. at 2102 (internal citations omitted). 
43. Id. at 2101-05. 
44. Id. at 2096-97. 
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should replace the physical presence requirement. The Court turned to the 
first prong of the Complete Auto test, which simply asks whether the tax 
applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State.45 The 
Court held that the three remote vendors satisfied this requirement. 
“[H]ere, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and 
virtual contacts respondents have with the State.”46 Because of the 
thresholds, the Act applies only to sellers who engage in a significant 
quantity of business in the State, and respondents were “large, national 
companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual presence.”47 
“This quantity of business could not have occurred unless the seller 
availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in South 
Dakota.”48  
The holding of the Court is that the physical presence test is no longer 
required for a finding of nexus under the Commerce Clause. The Court did 
not hold that if the South Dakota thresholds were not satisfied, a remote 
vendor could not be required to collect the sales tax. The question will be 
whether based on the particular facts, the vendor availed itself of the 
substantial privilege of carrying on business in the state. Facts come in all 
different sizes and shapes and can be quirky or idiosyncratic. Satisfying a 
state’s thresholds might trigger nexus if there were other safeguards (e.g., 
no retroactivity and membership in the Streamlined Sales Tax 
Agreement), but the converse is not automatically true. A pedestrian 
example would be if a vendor had a store in a state having sales that were 
less than the thresholds.49 The South Dakota statute has no effect on the 
State’s existing state law on physical presence, which remains sufficient, 
but not necessary after Wayfair, to establish nexus. 
To be sure, the Court was concerned that without the physical presence 
rule, undue burdens might be imposed on some vendors. “[T]he daunting 
complexity and business development obstacles of nationwide sales tax 
collection”50 “may pose legitimate concerns in some instances, particularly 
 
45. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977). For an analysis of “substantial 
nexus.” See infra Part II. 
46. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. See infra notes 186, 198, and accompanying text. 
50. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/7
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for small businesses that make a small volume of sales to customers in 
many States.”51 But software was available that would help, and Congress 
could deal with the most egregious circumstances.  
In addition to software, the Court looked favorably on three features of 
South Dakota law that would help protect smaller vendors: the thresholds, 
the lack of retroactivity,52 and the State’s adoption of the Streamlined 
Sales and Use Tax Agreement, which reduces compliance burdens.53 The 
Court did not hold that the South Dakota statute was constitutional. Nor 
did it hold that a statute with similar features to South Dakota’s would be 
constitutional as applied to a particular taxpayer. All it did was eliminate 
the physical presence requirement.  
True, in dicta, the Court strongly suggested that the combination of the 
thresholds, lack of retroactivity, and membership in the Streamlined Sales 
Tax Agreement would pass constitutional muster.54 The Court indicated, 
however, that any remaining claims regarding the Commerce Clause’s 
application in the absence of Quill and Bellas Hess may be addressed in 
the first instance on remand, perhaps under Pike balancing.55  
 
51. Id. 
52. The Court cited the Brief for Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae 7, n.5 for the proposition 
that “retroactive liability risks a double tax burden in violation of the Court’s apportionment 
jurisprudence because it would make both the buyer and the seller legally liable for collecting and 
remitting the tax on a transaction intended to be taxed only once.” Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099; see also 
infra note 84; Paige Jones, New York Could Pursue Retroactivity Post-Wayfair, Practitioner Says, 
STATE TAX NOTES (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/nexus/new-york-could-
pursue-retroactivity-post-wayfair-practitioner-
says/2019/03/01/2963y?highlight=State%20Could%20Pursue%20Retroactivity%20Post-Wayfair. Six 
on-line retailers are suing Massachusetts over the tax department’s enforcement of its remote sales tax 
regulations pre-Wayfair. Paige Jones, Online Retailers Sue Massachusetts DOR Over Back Tax 
Payments, STATE TAX NOTES (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/litigation-
and-appeals/online-retailers-sue-massachusetts-dor-over-back-tax-
payments/2018/12/31/28ql3?highlight=Online%20Retailers%20Sue%20DOR%20Over%20Back%20
Tax%20Payments. 
53. See infra Part VII.B. The Agreement “standardizes taxes to reduce administrative and 
compliance costs: It requires a single, state level tax administration, uniform definitions of products 
and services, simplified tax rate structures, and other uniform rules. It also provides sellers access to 
sales tax administration software paid for by the State. Sellers who choose to use such software are 
immune from audit liability.” Id. at 2100. 
54. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098. 
55. Id. at 2100. See infra Part VIII. On remand the lower court would determine “whether some 
other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act.” Id. at 2099. 
Presumably, the Court meant invalidate the application of the Act to a particular situation. On Oct. 31, 
2018, South Dakota Governor Daugaard announced that the State had entered into a settlement 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Nowhere does the Court focus specifically on any unfair competition 
between a remote vendor with sales below a threshold and a local store 
also having sales below that same threshold but one that has to collect a 
sales tax.56 Nowhere does the Court acknowledge that the greater the 
protection for the out-of-state vendors, the more unfair it is to the in-state 
competitors. 
 
B. The Concurrence 
 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas reprised his usual refrain that 
the Court’s dormant commerce clause is wrong because it is not based on 
the Constitution and thus should be abandoned. Nonetheless, he conceded 
that Bellas Hess and Quill “can no longer be rationally justified.”57  
Justice Gorsuch also wrote a short concurrence,58 closely watched to see 
if he would disclose his views on the dormant commerce clause. He did 
not. While noting that Bellas Hess and Quill were a mistake,59 Justice 
Gorsuch described the dormant commerce clause as raising “questions for 
another day” regarding whether that doctrine “can be squared with the text 
of the Commerce Clause, justified by stare decisis, or defended as 
misbranded products of federalism or antidiscrimination imperatives 
flowing from Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.”60  
 
C. The Dissent 
 
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, 
 
agreement and stipulation of dismissal in Wayfair. Press Release, Office of South Dakota, Oct. 31, 
2018. “This final settlement agreement brings a conclusion to all remaining issues not addressed by the 
United States Supreme Court.” Id. Under the terms of the settlement, Wayfair, Overstock, and Newegg 
started collecting the South Dakota sales tax beginning Jan. 1, 2019, conveniently after the holiday 
shopping season. All others started collecting on November 1, 2018. S.B. 106, 2016 Legis. Assemb., 
91st Sess. (S.D. 2016). 
56. See infra note 198. 
57. Id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also wished he had joined with Justice 
White’s dissent in Quill. Id. Justice Gorsuch, who was not on the Quill court, also favorably cited 
White. Id. at 2100 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
58. Id. at 2100-01. 
59. Id.  
60. Id. at 2100-01. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/7
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and Kagan.61 Their position was simple. They “agree[d ]that Bellas Hess 
was wrongly decided for many of the reasons given by the Court,”62 but 
argued that Congress is better suited for determining what to do.63 “E-
commerce has grown into a significant and vibrant part of our national 
economy against the backdrop of established rules, including the physical-
presence rule.64 Any alteration to those rules with the potential to disrupt 
the development of such a critical segment of the economy should be 
undertaken by Congress. The Court should not act on this important 
question of current economic policy, solely to expiate a mistake it made 
over 50 years ago.”65 
Unlike the majority, which found reliance on Bellas Hess and Quill to 
be “illegitimate,”66 the dissent emphasized the principle of stare decisis. 
“Departing from the doctrine of stare decisis is an ‘exceptional action’ 
demanding ‘special justification.’”67 “The bar is even higher in fields in 
which Congress ‘exercises primary authority’ and can, if it wishes, 
override this Court’s decisions with contrary legislation.”68 The competing 
interests at stake make the collection of taxes by remote vendors especially 
suited for Congress to balance and resolve:69 
 
Here, after investigation, Congress could reasonably decide that 
current trends might sufficiently expand tax revenues, obviating the 
need for an abrupt policy shift with potentially adverse 
consequences for e-commerce. Or Congress might decide that the 
benefits of allowing States to secure additional tax revenue 
outweigh any foreseeable harm to e-commerce. Or Congress might 
elect to accommodate these competing interests, by, for example, 
 
61. Id. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 2104. 
64. I have argued elsewhere that the dramatic growth of the mail-order industry might have been 
attributed to the rise of the national credit cards, the 800-telephone call, and UPS and Federal Express. 
Richard D. Pomp, Revisiting Miller Brothers, Bellas Hess, and Quill, 65 AM. L. REV. 1115, 1142 
n.151 (2016). 
65. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2101. 
66. Id. at 2098. 
67. Id. at 2101 (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). 
68. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014)). 
69. Id. at 2104. 
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allowing States to tax Internet sales by remote retailers only if 
revenue from such sales exceeds some set amount per year. . . In 
any event, Congress can focus directly on current policy concerns 
rather than past legal mistakes. Congress can also provide a nuanced 
answer to the troubling question whether any change will have 
retroactive effect.70 
 
The more liberal of the dissenters (Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) 
might have had a political agenda in emphasizing the principle of stare 
decisis. They might fear that the newly constituted Court will erode its 
more liberal decisions on gay rights, abortion rights, school prayer, the 
death penalty, prisoners’ rights, same sex marriage, and affirmative action, 
for which former Justice Kennedy was often the swing vote.71 The erosion 
might come less from a frontal attack and outright reversal of these cases, 
 
70. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
71. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (University of Texas’ use of 
race as a factor in admissions decisions did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (various state laws banning same-sex marriage 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, effectively legalizing gay marriage 
nationwide); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) (Eighth Amendment prohibits states from executing 
individuals with intellectual disabilities); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (Defense of 
Marriage Act, which defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman, violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (court-ordered limit on 
California’s prison population did not violate federal law, and was necessary to remedy 
unconstitutional violations of prisoners’ rights); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth 
Amendment forbids a punishment of life imprisonment without an opportunity for parole for a juvenile 
not convicted of homicide); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (Eighth Amendment bars 
states from executing individuals convicted of child rape); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) 
(holding, inter alia, that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to prisoners detained at 
Guantanamo Bay); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s holding 
that a state may execute an individual without violating the Eighth Amendment as long as that 
individual has some factual awareness of the state’s reasoning for the execution); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Eighth Amendment prohibits states from executing juveniles); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Texas law banning same-sex sexual conduct unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Colorado 
constitutional amendment prohibiting the State from enacting laws to protect gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
individuals from discrimination violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Lee 
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prayer at a public school graduation that was not associated with a 
specific religion violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion) (reaffirming Roe v. Wade’s central holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects a woman’s right to obtain an abortion). 
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but more from a series of inroads, narrowings, and restrictions.72 To guard 
against this, the Court’s liberals have to emphasize the principle of stare 
decisis.73 
The rest of this Article will focus on the case, its implications, and the 
Court’s missed opportunities. Part II argues that the term “substantial 
nexus,” mentioned only once in Complete Auto,74 and which was the first 
time the Court used it in a tax case, should be given no weight. The term 
was not used by the taxpayer (Complete Auto), which referred to 
“sufficient nexus.” Indeed, the taxpayer conceded that it had sufficient 
nexus so that the issue of nexus was not even before the Court. 
Nonetheless, Quill latched onto the term to distinguish Commerce Clause 
nexus from Due Process Clause nexus.75  
This unprecedented bifurcation of nexus served the Court’s political 
agenda: removing any due process obstacles to Congress’s intervention 
while protecting the reliance interests of the remote vendors. Wayfair 
should have discarded the term, which Quill located in the Commerce 
Clause and returned the concept of nexus back to its roots in the Due 
Process Clause. 
 Part III contends that although Wayfair dealt only with the sales tax, its 
implications extend widely. No longer can a taxpayer make a credible 
argument in the context of other taxes that a physical presence is required 
for it to have nexus.  
 Of course, Congress can always overrule Wayfair and perhaps reinstate 
the physical presence rule. Part IV shows why the politics are more 
favorable for doing so post-Wayfair, where Congress can be viewed as 
protecting vendors, than they were pre-Wayfair where Congress might be 
viewed (incorrectly) as imposing a new tax on Internet purchases. Bills 
 
72. For a frontal attack on public sector labor unions, overturning a 40-year-old precedent, see 
Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 
(2018). The liberals on the Court (Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, Sotomayor) wrote a blistering dissent, 
emphasizing the principle of stare decisis. With the exception of Justice Ginsburg, this group also 
dissented in Wayfair. Ginsburg’s voting with the majority in Wayfair is consistent with her emphasis 
on state sovereignty in Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1816-18 (2015) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
73. See Richard D. Pomp, Inroads, Narrowing, and Restrictions, 90 STATE TAX NOTES 1029 
(2018).  
74. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977).  
75. Throughout this Article, due process refers to the 14th Amendment and not the 5th Amendment. 
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have already been introduced to cut back on Wayfair although as this 
Article goes to press, none has shown any traction.  
 Part V cautions states from eliminating their pre-Wayfair techniques 
for dealing with Quill, such as click through nexus and Colorado-style 
reporting. Because the states seem not to be applying Wayfair 
retroactively, there will be open audit years when physical presence will 
remain the relevant nexus standard. And Congress might impose that 
standard through federal legislation. Pre-Wayfair techniques will still be 
relevant then and should be held in reserve to draw on when necessary. 
 Pre-Wayfair remote vendors without a physical presence in a state 
could be assured that they did not have to collect the market state’s use 
tax.76 Wayfair eliminates that assurance. But what if off-shore vendors 
continue not to collect the market state’s use tax even though they are now 
obligated to do so, or even worse, collect the tax but not remit it? Part VI 
allays fears about these possibilities. 
 Part VII provides a brief summary of state reactions to Wayfair and 
explains why there will not be a rush to adopt the Streamlined Sales Tax 
Agreement. This Part offers advice about how to draft a post-Wayfair 
statute, suggesting that if the transaction threshold is an alternative to the 
sales threshold as it is in South Dakota and in those states mimicking 
South Dakota law, it is not especially useful. These states should consider 
requiring that both the transaction threshold and the sales threshold must 
be satisfied and not just one or the other. If a state wishes to use only one 
threshold, it should be sales and not transactions. 
 Other advice in Part VII is that a state should retain its existing rules on 
physical presence, which may be needed during open audit years or if 
Congress overrules Wayfair. Nothing is gained, and some revenue may be 
lost by eliminating these existing rules. In addition, there are situations in 
which a small in-state retailer collecting the sales tax pre-Wayfair should 
 
76. The use tax is a backstop to a sales tax. The use tax applies to goods bought outside a state but 
“used” in that state. The use tax is imposed at the same rate as the sales tax and a credit is provided 
against the use tax for any sales taxes (or use taxes) paid to the other state on the same transaction. See 
POMP, supra note 28, at 6-41-44. The use tax was upheld by the Supreme Court in Henneford v. Silas 
Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937); cf. Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934). The use tax 
is imposed on the purchaser, but with the exception of cars, boats, or planes, which have to be 
registered in a state, voluntary compliance is notoriously low by individuals. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 
2088. Hence the pressure to make sure the vendor collects the use tax. 
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continue to do so even if its sales fall below post-Wayfair thresholds. 
 For reasons that have never been explained, South Dakota drafted its 
statute in terms of collecting its sales tax rather than its use tax. The state 
may be inadvertently leaving money on the table. Situations may arise 
where a sale does not take place in South Dakota, but a use tax could 
otherwise be collected. In addition, limiting the statute to the collection of 
the sales tax and not the use tax may raise problems because of a pair of 
Supreme Court cases in 1944: McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.77 and General 
Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n.78 The risk-adverse way to proceed is 
not to copy South Dakota on this point but to follow the more 
conventional approach and draft a post-Wayfair statute in terms of 
collecting the use tax. 
Part VIII explores the Pike balancing test. This test has played no 
prominent role in state tax cases but has been elevated by Wayfair into a 
key feature of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
Part IX shifts the focus to local sales and use taxes and predicts that this 
area will be the source of future litigation. 
 
II. SUBSTANTIAL NEXUS: A MEANINGLESS  
MEANS TO A POLITICAL END 
 
Despite four dissents in Wayfair,79 all nine Justices agreed on one 
thing—that Quill was “wrong on its own terms when it was decided in 
1992,” and “since then the Internet revolution has made its earlier error all 
the more egregious and harmful.”80 But the one error in Quill that the 
Court did not address was the most serious jurisprudentially: the 
deification of Complete Auto’s81 empty phrase: substantial nexus. 
 
77. 322 U.S. 327 (1944). 
78. 322 U.S. 335 (1944). 
79. Wayfair, 138 S.Ct. at 2080.  
80. Id. at 2097. This blatant admission could have been easily finessed had the Court wished by 
stating that Quill was correctly decided in 1992 but was overtaken by subsequent events like the 
Internet. Instead, the Court made a candid, frontal attack on overruling Quill ab initio. The Court’s 
candor in admitting its error in 1992 should have carried over to similarly admitting that “substantial 
nexus” was also an error. Perhaps one reason for not doing so was that neither party in Wayfair was 
making such a request. 
81. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
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Quill was a political decision.82 The latching on to Complete Auto’s 
throwaway phrase, “substantial nexus,” in a case having nothing to do 
with nexus, allowed the Quill Court to further its political agenda. That 
agenda was to clear the way for Congress to establish rules requiring 
remote vendors to collect the market state’s use tax, while protecting their 
reliance interests on Bellas Hess83 and avoiding the retroactivity issue.84  
Bellas Hess had immunized remote vendors from a state requiring them 
to collect its use tax if they had no physical presence there. Quill 
cleverly—but without any jurisprudential support—accomplished its 
agenda by breathing meaning into Complete Auto’s cavalier use of 
“substantial nexus.” That term allowed Quill to bifurcate the concept of 
nexus so that it had a different meaning under the Due Process Clause 
from its meaning under the Commerce Clause. 
This unprecedented bifurcation was critical to carrying out the Court’s 
agenda.85 Previously, opponents of Congress’s stripping remote vendors of 
their Bellas Hess protection argued that Congress could not legislate on 
 
82. See Richard D. Pomp, supra note 64, at 1141–1154. 
83. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). Bellas Hess came to be interpreted 
as holding that a remote vendor without a physical presence in the market state did not have to collect 
that state’s use tax, even though the case never used the term “physical presence.” Quill attributed the 
growth of the mail order industry to this protection provided by Bellas Hess. Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 315, 316 (1992). “Indeed, it is not unlikely that the mail-order industry’s dramatic 
growth over the last quarter century is due in part to the bright-line exemption from state taxation 
created in Bellas Hess.” Id. at 315. What Quill did not explicitly mention was that that advantage was 
based on the customer failing to report voluntarily the use tax, which was owed regardless of whether 
the remote vendor collected it. Id. at 315. Wayfair made that point rather graphically. Wayfair, 138 
S.Ct. at 2098. 
84. Quill's petition for a writ of certiorari set forth two questions: (1) Whether the North Dakota 
Supreme Court is obligated to follow the longstanding precedent of Bellas Hess, and (2) Whether the 
North Dakota Supreme Court may give retroactive effect to its decision, which is contrary to 
established constitutional precedent, to make Quill liable for uncollected use taxes back to July 1, 
1987? State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 1991 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 681, at *1 (U.S. Aug. 2, 1991) (No. 93-11). The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on only the first issue. Quill Corp. v. N. Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 502 U.S. 808 (1991); see 
Quill, 504 U.S. at 332 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[W]e specifically limited 
the question on which certiorari was granted in order not to consider the potential retroactive effects of 
overruling Bellas Hess.").  
Quill occurred during a period of intense disagreement and upheaval by the Court on the general issue 
of retroactivity. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); see generally 
Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, and David Gamage, Wayfair and the Retroactivity of 
Constitutional Holdings, 88 STATE TAX NOTES 511 (2018). 
85. Justice White called out the majority on its bifurcation of nexus. Quill, 504 U.S. at 327. 
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matters of due process.86 If Bellas Hess held, as a matter of due process, 
that remote vendors without a physical presence could not be forced to 
collect the market state’s use tax, Congress would be powerless to act. 
Efforts to overturn Bellas Hess were often stalled for fear that, after 
spending scarce political capital on drafting and lobbying for legislation, 
the Due Process Clause might doom the result. The Constitution does not 
delegate to Congress the power to strip anyone of their due process 
protections. As long as Bellas Hess was good law, it was feared that 
Congress was powerless to overturn that decision through legislation. 
By holding that Quill, the remote vendor, had due process connections 
with North Dakota despite lacking a physical presence, the Quill Court 
overturned that part of Bellas Hess and cleared the way for Congress to 
act. Simultaneously, the Quill Court held that Complete Auto imposed a 
substantial nexus requirement under the Commerce Clause, which 
required the very physical presence the Court had just eliminated as a 
precondition under the Due Process Clause. 
This jurisprudential legerdemain implemented the Court’s political 
agenda. This approach, however, came with a high jurisprudential cost. It 
had no support in the case law, although the Court tried to tease it from 
Complete Auto’s passing reference to substantial nexus.87 The Quill Court 
described the “different constitutional concerns and policies” animating 
the Due Process and the Commerce Clauses88 and underscored Complete 
Auto’s use of the term “substantial nexus.” Complete Auto was a 
Commerce Clause case, and its use of substantial nexus supported, 
according to the Court, a different meaning for nexus than its meaning 
under the Due Process Clause. Unfortunately, the Court cited no cases to 
 
86. 504 U.S. at 305, 318. 
87. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 289 (1977). The only holding of Complete 
Auto was that Mississippi’s tax on the privilege of doing business within the state did not violate the 
Commerce Clause when applied to an interstate business. Id. The result in Complete Auto was hardly 
unexpected and foreshadowed by numerous cases. These cases are summarized in Complete Auto. Id. 
Complete Auto overruled Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), which held 
that a state tax on the “privilege of doing business” was per se unconstitutional when applied to 
interstate commerce. Id. at 289.  
88. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312 (stating that the Due Process Clause “concerns the fundamental fairness 
of governmental activity,” whereas the Commerce Clause’s “nexus requirement” addresses “structural 
concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national economy”). 
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support its approach—and for good reason. Only one prior case had used 
“substantial nexus,” and it was not a tax case.89 
As Wayfair nicely catalogs, the physical presence requirement is silly. 
Rather than addressing the underlying concerns of the Commerce Clause, 
the requirement undercuts those concerns.90 Combined with the dishonesty 
of bifurcating nexus and its reliance on the empty phrase of substantial 
nexus, I cannot help but wonder if the Court assumed that Congress would 
quickly embrace its new power and intervene with federal legislation, 
sparing the country the spectacle of the decision being skewered by 
commentators for over a quarter of a century.91 
 
A. Complete Auto and the Non-Issue of Nexus 
 
The issue in Complete Auto was whether a tax on the privilege of doing 
business within a state can be applied to an activity in interstate 
commerce.92 Given how the Quill Court imbued meaning into substantial 
nexus, it is astonishing that the issue of nexus was not even before the 
Complete Auto Court.93 Of course, an argument about nexus would have 
been a fool’s errand. The taxpayer was transporting automobiles within 
Mississippi94—a stark example of physical presence and nexus. The case 
is clear that the taxpayer assumed it had sufficient nexus with 
Mississippi,95 and anything the Court might have said about nexus would 
 
89. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 82 (1976). 
90. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095-99. 
91. For a sampling of cases eviscerating Quill and the physical presence test, see POMP, supra note 
28, at 9-82-83. 
92. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 274 (“The issue in this case is whether Mississippi runs afoul of the 
Commerce Clause . . . when it applies the tax it imposes on ‘the privilege of . . . doing business within 
the State to appellant’s activity in interstate commerce”).  
93. The court stated that “[a]ppellant, in its complaint in Chancery Court, did not allege that its 
activity which Mississippi taxes does not have a sufficient nexus with the State . . .” Id. at 277-78 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, the court explained that “[t]he appellant also did not allege in 
Chancery Court that the tax discriminated against interstate commerce, was unfairly apportioned, or 
was unrelated to services provided by the State.” Id. at 278. How what the appellant did not allege 
morphed into the four tests of whether a statute is constitutional is saved for another day. 
94. Id. at 275. For a picture of the type of vehicle involved in Complete Auto, see POMP, supra note 
28, at 1-21. In general, anything that can kill you, like a truck carrying cars, constitutes nexus. 
95. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 277–278. 
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have been dicta at best. Complete Auto never had to address whether it 
viewed nexus as a due process issue or a Commerce Clause issue. 
Moreover, the cavalier way Complete Auto vacillated in its description 
of the nexus requirement was inconsistent with a Court that thought it was 
formulating a new, unprecedented Commerce Clause interpretation of 
nexus. For example, only once did Complete Auto refer to “substantial 
nexus”;96 more often, it referred to “sufficient nexus”97 or “sufficiently 
connected.”98 Additionally, Complete Auto cited cases referring to nexus 
in its more traditional due process context as a “necessary connection,”99 
or as “sufficient nexus.”100 Finally, Complete Auto was the first time the 
Court ever used the term “substantial nexus” in a tax case.101 This was not 
a Court that attributed any significance to the one time it used the term 
“substantial nexus” in a case where nexus was not even being challenged, 
but was instead conceded; it obviously was not injecting that term with 
any new jurisprudential meaning. If it were intending otherwise, we might 
have expected a drum roll as the Court trotted out this new Commerce 
Clause nexus standard (albeit in dicta) with great fanfare. 
As if further evidence is even needed, in National Geographic,102 
decided less than a month after Complete Auto, the Court stated: “The 
question presented by this case is whether the Society’s activities at the 
offices in California provided sufficient nexus between the out-of-state 
seller appellant and the State—as required by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause—to support the 
imposition upon the Society of a use-tax-collection liability.”103 If in 
Complete Auto the use of the modifier “substantial” was purposeful rather 
than casual, then the Court, without any notice, must have changed its 
mind less than one month later when National Geographic was decided. 
National Geographic was also quite telling in that the Court viewed the 
 
96. Id. at 279. 
97. Id. at 285. 
98. Id. at 287. 
99. Id. at 281. 
100. Id. at 278, 285. 
101. Supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
102. Nat’l Geographic Soc. v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977). 
103. Id. at 554 (emphasis added). 
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concept of nexus as identical under both the Due Process Clause and the 
Commerce Clause, belying Quill’s bifurcation. 
 
B. Quill’s Selective Use of Substantial Nexus 
 
The Quill Court reached down into Complete Auto and picked up the 
one--and only--reference in that case to substantial nexus. That solved the 
Quill Court’s dilemma and provided the fig leaf to keep the case from 
turning into a transparently unprincipled, blatantly political decision. The 
other references in Complete Auto, such as “sufficient nexus,” “sufficient 
connection,” or “necessary connection” sounded too much like due 
process concepts to serve the Court’s agenda. No one could applaud Quill 
for its analytic purity. 
Justice White easily saw through Quill’s chicanery.104 He concurred 
with the majority’s decision to overrule Bellas Hess’s requirement of 
physical presence for nexus under the Due Process Clause.105 But he 
viewed the Due Process and Commerce Clauses as having the same nexus 
requirement, and would have given Bellas Hess “the complete burial it 
justly deserves,”106 (which nine justices in Wayfair happily provided 26 
years later.) White scolded the Quill majority for its unprincipled 
approach, noting that “[t]he Court freely acknowledges that there is no 
authority for this novel interpretation of our cases and that we have never 
before found, as we do in this case, sufficient contacts for due process 
purposes but an insufficient nexus under the Commerce Clause.”107 
Unprecedented though it might be, this bifurcation of nexus allowed the 
Court to preserve Bellas Hess’s safe haven under the Commerce Clause, 
while removing any perceived barrier to Congressional intervention under 
the Due Process Clause. 
 
 
104. In his concurrence in Wayfair, Justice Thomas admitted that he should have ruled with Justice 
White in Quill. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
105. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 321-22 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Interestingly, Bellas Hess never uses the term “physical presence.” See supra note 
83. 
106. Id. at 322. 
107. Id. at 325.  
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C. Wayfair and a Missed Opportunity to Correct Quill’s  
Illegitimate Reliance on Substantial Nexus 
 
The Wayfair Court could have added the erroneous reading of Complete 
Auto’s substantial nexus to its litany of reasons for overruling Quill. Of 
course, neither party was asking the Court to do so. But if the Wayfair 
Court was going to try to bring order to the problem of remote vendors 
and the collection of the use tax,108 cleaning up the nexus standard would 
have been a useful step. And a Court that had the courage to overrule 
Quill109 ab initio should not have shied away from finishing the task. After 
all, the Wayfair Court could have said that the physical presence rule was 
appropriate in 1992 but not in the digital world. Instead, the Court took the 
bolder path and overturned the rule as misguided from the time of its 
original formulation. That boldness might have carried over into 
overturning the substantial nexus rule sua sponte—but did not.  
Instead, Wayfair muddied the nexus standard. Citing dicta from Polar 
Tankers,110 the Court stated a “substantial nexus” is established when the 
taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying 
on business’ in that jurisdiction.”111 Polar Tankers, a fairly uneventful 
case interpreting the rarely litigated Tonnage Clause of the Constitution--
not the dormant Commerce Clause--has an ironic similarity with Complete 
Auto. Neither case had anything to do with nexus, yet Wayfair cited both 
in that context. 
 
108. I purposely refer to the “use” tax here and not the “sales” tax for the reasons explained infra 
Part VII.C.5. 
109. See supra note 80. 
110. Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1 (2009). 
111. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. The Polar Tankers Court followed the language cited by Wayfair 
with references to Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 437, 443 (1992), a case 
holding that Vermont could tax Mobil, which had gas stations in the state, on dividends it received 
from foreign subsidiaries; Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 441–445 (1979), 
holding that California could levy an apportioned property tax on shipping containers located in the 
State and used in international commerce; and Quill. See Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 10 (2009). The 
pages Wayfair cited in Mobil refer to both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause; the 
pages cited in Japan Line focus more on the Commerce Clause. Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 432; Japan 
Line, 441 U.S. at 435-36. In any event, these citations cannot be read to suggest the Court was 
jettisoning the substantial nexus requirement under the Commerce Clause and replacing it with the 
Due Process Clause.  
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Polar Tankers has played no dispositive role in any state or local tax 
case, has been infrequently cited, and was not cited by any of the parties in 
Wayfair, including the 40 or so amici. Even Polar Tankers, a 2009 case, 
made no mention of Complete Auto. So why did the Court resurrect the 
case? 
Perhaps Wayfair raised Polar Tankers sua sponte to deal with the 
assertions made at oral argument by South Dakota that one sale would be 
enough to constitute nexus.112 One sale, however, depending on the 
amount,113 might be unacceptable to constitute nexus under either the Due 
Process Clause or the Commerce Clause, regardless of whether the nexus 
standard is something less than substantial. As Justice Scalia reminded us, 
the law cares not for trifles.114  
The need to litigate the difference between “substantial” privilege and 
just plain old privilege suggests that Wayfair might have been better off 
simply disavowing Quill’s reliance on Complete Auto’s casual and 
cavalier use of substantial nexus. Instead, Wayfair has opened the door to 
potential litigation over when a privilege might be substantial enough for 
nexus. About the only thing we now know is that this substantial privilege 
requirement was satisfied “based on both the economic and virtual 
contacts” the vendors had with South Dakota and that the defendants’, 
“large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual 
presence[,]” satisfy the standard.115 Under the facts in Wayfair, the Court 
concluded that: 
 
112. In response to Justice Sotomayor’s question at oral argument what the minimum number of 
sales was needed to constitute nexus, the South Dakota Attorney General stated: “The minimum would 
be one sale because, if you look at Complete Auto, that creates the nexus.” Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 6, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494). Complete Auto, of 
course, said nothing about the number of sales that would create nexus. See generally Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). The government, appearing as amicus curiae, supported 
the South Dakota Attorney General. Video: South Dakota v. Wayfair Oral Argument (C-SPAN 
broadcast Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?441646-1/south-dakota-v-wayfair-oral-
argument&start=0. 
113. A one-time sale of a plane, boat, or nuclear reactor would raise different concerns from a sale of 
say a $5 item.  
114. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992) (“the venerable 
maxim de minimis non curat lex (‘the law cares not for trifles’) is part of the established background 
of legal principles against which all enactments are adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary 
indication) are deemed to accept.”). Justice Scalia was writing in the context of a federal statute, P.L. 
86-272, but the same policies should apply in interpreting nexus.  
115. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.  
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the nexus is clearly sufficient116 based on both the economic and 
virtual contacts respondents have with the State. The Act applies 
only to sellers that deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services 
into South Dakota or engage in 200 or more separate transactions 
for the delivery of goods and services into the State on an annual 
basis. S. B. 106, §1. This quantity of business could not have 
occurred unless the seller availed itself of the substantial privilege 
of carrying on business in South Dakota. And respondents are large, 
national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual 
presence. Thus, the substantial nexus requirement of Complete Auto 
is satisfied in this case.117 
A disavowment of substantial nexus could have returned the concept of 
nexus back to its roots in the Due Process Clause.118 Wayfair perhaps 
hinted at this when it stated that the “reasons given in Quill for rejecting 
the physical presence rule for due process purposes apply as well to the 
question whether physical presence is a requisite for an out-of-state 
seller’s liability to remit sales taxes.”119 This analytical purity would not 
be a panacea given the lack of any coherent due process doctrine,120 but it 
 
116. Presumably Kennedy meant that the contacts were sufficient to satisfy the substantial nexus 
standard, not that “sufficient nexus” was the new standard. In his concurrence in Direct Marketing 
Justice Kennedy sloppily used the phrase “sufficiently ‘substantial nexus.’” Direct Marketing Ass’n v. 
Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015). 
117. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. See Calhoun & Kolarik, supra note 33, at 130:  
Post-Wayfair, the new substantial nexus test turns on whether a taxpayer has availed itself of 
the substantial privilege of carrying on business in the taxing jurisdiction at issue. In keeping 
with tradition, the Court left the minimum threshold of this sufficiency test undefined, for 
lower courts to determine. Because the substantial nexus analysis is fact-specific, the only 
existing guidance for determining the sufficiency of the economic and virtual contacts that 
satisfy this test are the particular South Dakota contacts of the business involved in the 
Wayfair litigation.  
118. For an attempt to breathe some meaning into “substantial nexus” if we are forced to live with it 
despite its lack of foundation, see Hayes Holderness, Questioning Quill, 37 VA. TAX. REV. 313, 328 
(2018). 
119. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2085. The Court also recognized that “[w]hen considering whether a 
State may levy a tax, Due Process and Commerce Clause standards may not be identical or 
coterminous, but there are significant parallels.” Id. 
120. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
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would at least avoid running two concepts of nexus on parallel tracks, 
even if the distance between them seems to have narrowed.  
 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF WAYFAIR FOR OTHER TAXES. 
 
The states had been successful in arguing pre-Wayfair that the physical 
presence standard was limited to the sales and use taxes.121 These cases 
have relied on three statements in Quill. “While contemporary Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to 
arise for the first time today, Bellas Hess is not inconsistent with Complete 
Auto and our recent cases.”122  
In sum, although in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and 
concerning other types of taxes we have not adopted a similar 
bright-line, physical-presence requirement, our reasoning in those 
cases does not compel that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess 
established in the area of sales and use taxes.123  
“Although we have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated 
the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for 
sales and use taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation of the Bellas 
Hess rule.”124  
By eliminating the physical presence requirement for sales and use 
taxes, the Court has also eliminated, by inference, the underpinnings of 
these statements for other taxes as well,125 such as the corporate income 
tax, pure gross receipts taxes like Washington’s B and O tax, or Ohio’s 
CAT tax.126 Wayfair is also consistent with the MTC factor presence nexus 
 
121. See, e.g., Geoffrey , Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 313 S.C. 15, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
992 (1993); Tax Comm’r v. MBNA Am. Bank, 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006); KFC Corp. v. Iowa 
Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010); Capital One Auto Fin. Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 792 
N.W.2d 308 (Or. 2018); POMP, supra note 28, at 11-206. 
122. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (emphasis added). 
123. Id. at 317 (emphasis added). 
124. Id. at 314 (emphasis added). 
125. Accord Calhoun & Kolarik, supra note 33. 
126. The term “gross receipts” is used in at least two different contexts, which has created confusion 
in the literature. One meaning is a sales tax that is levied on a vendor’s gross receipts. Quill, 504 U.S. 
at 309-10; POMP, supra note 28, at 7-2. The other, a “pure” gross receipts tax, is a business turnover 
tax of the type used by the State of Washington, Ohio, and certain counties, municipalities, and cities. 
POMP, supra note 28, at 9-221. 
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standard127 for income taxes and is likely to encourage those that have not 
already done so, to move in that direction. And of course, Tyler Pipe128 
and Scripto129 sit out there with an open-ended test for nexus with no 
reference to property, payroll, or sales—just the activities performed on 
behalf of the taxpayer. Wayfair may also have implications for the Court’s 
due process jurisprudence130 and Public Law 86-272.131 
 
127. MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, FACTOR PRESENCE NEXUS STANDARD FOR BUSINESS ACTIVITY 
TAXES (2002). The MTC’s Model Statute states that a “[s]ubstantial nexus is established if any of the 
following thresholds is exceeded during the tax period: (a) a dollar amount of $50,000 of property; or 
(b) a dollar amount of $50,000 of payroll; or (c) a dollar amount of $500,000 of sales; or (d) twenty-
five percent of total property, total payroll or total sales.” Id. As of a 2018 survey, 14 states reported 
that their nexus policy is based on factor presence, with five states indicating their standards wholly or 
partially conform with the Multistate Tax Commission's model statute. Jennifer McLoughlin, 
Bloomberg Tax 18th Annual Survey: States Studying Federal Changes, Accounting Policy & Practice 
Rep. BNA No. 103, at 9 (2018). Thirty-two of the states surveyed stated that they apply economic 
presence standards to define corporate income tax nexus. Id. Disagreement exists on whether the test 
of “undue burden” would be harder to satisfy under an income tax than a sales tax. Andrea Muse, State 
Income Tax Not Likely to Cause Undue Burden After Wayfair, STATE TAX NOTES (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/corporate-taxation/state-income-tax-not-likely-cause-undue-
burden-after-
wayfair/2019/03/11/29731?highlight=State%20Income%20Tax%20Not%20Likely%20to%20Cause%
20Undue%20Burden%20After%20Wayfair. 
128. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250-51 (1987) (“‘the crucial 
factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer are 
significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in this state for 
the sales.’ The court [below] found this standard was satisfied because Tyler's ‘sales representatives 
perform any local activities necessary for maintenance of Tyler Pipe's market and protection of its 
interests . . . .’ We agree that the activities of Tyler's sales representatives adequately support the 
State's jurisdiction to impose its wholesale tax on Tyler” (internal citations omitted)). This standard 
can be satisfied without any sales into a state in a particular year. 
129. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) (independent contractors soliciting sales constitute 
nexus). 
130. See Alan Erbsen, Wayfair Undermines Nicastro: The Constitutional Connection Between State 
Tax Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 128 YALE L.J.___(forthcoming, 2019). See generally Hayes 
Holderness, Taking Tax Due Process Seriously: The Give and Take of State Taxation, 20 FLA. TAX 
REV. 317 (2017). 
131. Public Law 86-272 prevents a state from imposing a corporate income tax on out-of-state 
corporations whose only activities in a state consist of the solicitation of orders for the sale of tangible 
personal property, provided such orders are sent out-of-state for acceptance or rejection, and provided 
that such property is sent into the state from outside the state. 15 U.S.C. §§ 381–84 (2018). If Wayfair 
is interpreted as removing the protection that remote vendors previously claimed under an income tax 
from not having a physical presence, P.L. 86-272 will offer them an alternative argument. See Martin 
I. Eisenstein & Nathaniel A. Bessey, Wayfair and P.L. 86-272 in a Services Economy, 90 STATE TAX 
NOTES 501 (2018); Stanley R. Kaminski, Public Law 86-272 and Digital Goods, 90 STATE TAX 
NOTES 527 (2018); Richard L. Cram, No Shade for Cloud Computing Income Under P.L. 86-272, 89 
STATE TAX NOTES 1237 (2018); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The Federal Government’s Power 
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Wells Fargo certainly thinks Wayfair applies to a state income tax. 
Following Wayfair, Wells Fargo’s $5.2 billion second-quarter earnings in 
2018 included a $481 million net discrete income tax expense that was 
mostly related to state income taxes and driven by the Wayfair decision.132 
Apparently, some of Wells Fargo’s affiliates were taking the position for 
income tax purposes that because they had no physical presence in a state 
they had no income tax exposure.133 
 
IV. PROSPECTS FOR CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION. 
 
Wayfair changed the politics of congressional intervention. Pre-Wayfair, 
federal legislation overturning Quill and the physical presence standard 
would have been viewed by most consumers (incorrectly) as imposing a 
new tax on the Internet. This view would have been wrong, of course, 
because the use tax was always owed on the remote transaction, but most 
purchasers would not view it that way—and nor would the Tea Party.  
From Congress’s perspective, such legislation would be a lose-lose 
proposition. Congress would be accused of adopting a new tax without 
getting to keep any of the new revenue, which would inure to the benefit 
of the states.134 (Theoretically, Congress could reduce its aid to the states 
by the amount of revenue they would now be collecting, and, in that sense, 
Congress could benefit.) 
 
to Restrict State Taxation, 81 STATE TAX NOTES 547 (2016); POMP, supra note 28, at 11-28-42; Joe 
Crosby et al., Wayfair’s Potential Implications for Other Taxes, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 1247 (2018). 
132. See also Wayne D. Roberts, Wayfair: The Far-Reaching Effects of Killing Quill, 89 STATE TAX 
NOTES 985 (2018). 
133. “Following [Wayfair], some of our affiliated entities may be considered to be taxable based on 
an economic presence in the state, even if they have no physical presence in the state.” Andrea Muse, 
Wells Fargo Adjusts Income Tax Reserves Following Wayfair, STATE TAX NOTES (July 16, 2018), 
https://www.taxnotes.coc/editors-pick/wells-fargo-adjusts-income-tax-reserves-following-wayfair. The 
quoted statement was made by the CFO during an earnings call. The situation he described is an 
example of entity isolation, discussed in POMP, supra note 28, at 9-133 et seq. 
134. Similar concerns have been raised in the context of foreign vendors not collecting a state use 
tax, where one possible solution is for Congress to get U.S. Customs involved. But would Congress 
intervene? “You can see why the U.S. might be less than motivated because there’s not any revenue 
for the U.S. government. . . It all would go to the states.” William Hoke, Enforceability of Wayfair 
Decision on Foreign Companies Unclear, STATE TAX NOTES (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.hodgsonrush.com/as 
sets/htmldocumhtml/TaxAnalysts6.28.18.pdf. For a more general discussion of foreign vendors, see 
infra Part VI. 
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Post-Wayfair, Congress could now be viewed as the savior of the 
consumer by cutting back on the reach of the decision. About one month 
after the Wayfair decision, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee held a 
hearing on possible federal legislation. Some of the suggestions for federal 
legislation at that hearing included more generous thresholds to protect 
small businesses; mandating one single tax rate for remote sales; uniform 
definitions of taxable products, services, and exemptions; no caps or 
thresholds on taxable value of goods or services; uniform definitions of 
sales price, delivery charges, and the like; uniform rules for refunds, 
returns, discounts, and coupons; uniform return and electronic remittance 
forms; uniform rules for rounding and for treatment of bad debts; uniform 
dates and rules for sales tax holidays; a single exempt purchaser 
certificate; single audit on behalf of all participating states at the option of 
the seller; appeals of assessments through state court system without 
requiring prior payment of assessed amount; voluntary, non-binding, 
independent mediation; precise definition of physical presence to avoid 
disputes over who is a remote seller and what constitutes a remote sale; 
protection from retroactive taxation; annual certification by an 
independent federal agency of state compliance with simplification 
measures; no state or local tax authority may impose sales tax, gross 
receipts tax, or tax reporting obligation on a seller lacking federal 
statutorily defined “physical presence” except as provided in the federal 
legislation; vendor discount reflecting true cost of tax collection and 
remittance; federal district court exclusive jurisdiction over claims relating 
to noncompliance with simplification provisions of federal legislation; and 
vendor protection from consumer error in computing sales tax.135 Those 
who opposed any attempts at federal legislation pre-Wayfair may now 
become allies in such efforts. 
Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.) has introduced the Online Sales 
Simplicity and Small Business Relief Act of 2018 (H.R. 6814). The bill 
would prohibit states from imposing sales tax collection duties on “remote 
 
135. Examining the Wayfair Decision and its Ramifications for Consumers and Small Businesses 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Steve DelBianco, President, 
NetChoice), available at http://netchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2018-07-24-NetChoice-testimony-
House-Judiciary-hearing-on-Wayfair-1.pdf. See generally Doug Sheppard et al., Additional Thoughts 
on Judiciary’s Wayfair Hearing, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 865 (2018). 
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sellers” for sales occurring prior to the Court’s ruling in Wayfair on June 
21, 2018. It would: allow states to impose sales tax collections duties on 
remote sellers only for sales occurring after Jan. 1, 2019 and establish a 
“small business remote seller exemption” prohibiting states from requiring 
remote sellers with gross annual receipts below $10 million in the U.S. to 
collect and remit sales tax. As defined by the bill, a “remote seller” is a 
person without a physical presence in the taxing state. The term “physical 
presence” means, with respect to a person, that a person's business 
activities in the State include any of the following during such person's 
taxable year:  
(i) Being an individual physically in the State, or assigning one or more 
employees to be in the State; 
(ii) Using the services of an agent (excluding an employee) to establish 
or maintain a market in the State, if such agent does not perform business 
services in the State for any other person during such taxable year; 
(iii) The leasing or owning of tangible personal property (other than 
digital or alphanumeric data) or of real property in the State.” The bill also 
requires the states to join a multistate compact before they can impose 
collection requirements on remote vendors.  
Additional legislation prohibiting any state from collecting or reporting 
sales tax from businesses without a physical presence was introduced by 
Senator Jon Tester (D-Mont.), and co-sponsored by senators from Oregon 
and New Hampshire: The Stop Taxing Our Potential (STOP) Act (S. 
3180). All these states, of course, do not have sales taxes.  
Rep. Bob Gibbs, R-Ohio, reintroduced a bill entitled “The Protecting 
Small Business from Burdensome Compliance Costs Act (H.R. 6724).” 
According to Representative Gibbs, his bill balances the ability of states to 
collect online sales tax while preventing undue burden on small 
businesses. 
Gibbs said the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in South Dakota v. Wayfair 
Inc. “opened the door for the possibility of a complex maze of state and 
local sales taxes that would be nearly impossible for small businesses to 
navigate without raising compliance costs and, ultimately, raising the costs 
of goods for consumers.”136 “Under the bill, states could not collect sales 
 
136. Paige Jones, U.S. Lawmaker Reintroduces Online Sales Tax Bill Limiting State Authority, 
STATE TAX NOTES (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/legislation-and-
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tax from out-of-state vendors without physical presence nexus until they 
enacted legislation that provides a statewide uniform tax rate, permits out-
of-state vendors to remit sales tax to one location, and provides a statewide 
uniform provision that detailed what is taxable. The bill would also ban 
retroactive collection of sales taxes and prohibit states from requiring sales 
tax collection and remittance until January 1, 2020.”137 
Unsurprisingly, the Governing Board of the Streamlined Sales Tax 
Project has shifted its position after Wayfair. Previously, the Board 
supported federal legislation overturning Quill. It no longer supports 
federal intervention.138 
An irony lurks in the background. Some states have statutes requiring 
them to use additional tax revenues for reducing their personal income 
taxes.139 Sales tax increases post-Wayfair would reduce personal income 
taxes. If Congress were to then overrule Wayfair causing sales tax revenue 
to fall, the personal income tax (or other taxes) would increase unless 
spending were cut. Under either scenario, Congress would be blamed.140 
 
V. CLICK THROUGH NEXUS, COLORADO REPORTING, 
 COOKIE NEXUS ETC. STILL RELEVANT? 
 
Prior to Wayfair, states developed different techniques for refining the 
Quill requirement of physical presence. In Overstock,141 for example, the 
New York Court of Appeals upheld a statute upholding the nexus created 
 
lawmaking/us-lawmaker-reintroduces-online-sales-tax-bill-limiting-state-
authority/2019/01/10/291ll?highlight=Reint 
roduces%20Online%20Sales%20Tax. 
137. Id. 
138. Jad Chamseddine, Governing Board Not Likely to Back Federal Remote Seller Bill, STATE TAX 
NOTES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/online-sales-taxation/governing-
board 
-not-likely-back-federal-remote-seller-bill/2018/10/05/28h7t. 
139. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 73.03(71)(a) (2018). “[C]onservative lawmakers in Indiana are 
concerned that the projected growth in RST will fuel an unhealthy expansion of public spending, 
resulting in the dreaded phenomenon known as ‘big government.’ To counter the possibility, they’re 
proposing that any increases in Indiana’s RST revenues be matched, dollar-for-dollar, by reductions in 
other taxes — including property and income taxes.” Robert Goulder, Parlez-Vous Wayfair? Foreign 
Lessons on Taxing Remote, 91 TAX NOTES INT’L 317 (2018). See infra note 171. 
140. Joe Crosby et al., Sales Taxes in a Post-Wayfair, Post-Kennedy World, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 
241 (2018). 
141. Overstock.com, Inc. v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013). 
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by in-state persons soliciting sales, typically through a link on their web 
sites to a remote vendor in return for a commission.142 This approach 
became known as click-through nexus.  
Other states have adopted statutes to deal with the problem of entity 
isolation.143 In one common use of this approach, a dot.com wishing to 
have a physical presence in a state, such as a distribution center, without 
establishing a physical presence would create a subsidiary to own that 
property. The dot.com would then argue that it did not have nexus, a 
related party did, and that person’s nexus could not be attributed to the 
dot.com. Some states by statute treat the physical presence of the 
subsidiary as creating nexus for the dot.com.144  
Another approach is known as “disclosure” or “reporting” and requires 
that a remote vendor send both its customers and the tax departments of 
the state in which the customers are located a list of goods and services 
purchased. This approach was upheld by the 10th circuit, which rejected 
the argument that it violated Quill.145 Massachusetts has recently taken the 
most aggressive and problematic position that cookies on cell phones or 
computers constitute nexus.146  
Superficially, these approaches seem unnecessary for any state 
mimicking South Dakota’s law. But if a state changes its law only 
prospectively, there will be open years under the prior law for which these 
 
142. For the background on Overstock and click-through nexus in New York, see Robert D. Plattner,  
After Wayfair: Saying Goodbye to Click-Through Nexus, 90 STATE TAX NOTES 13 (2018). The 
constitutional footing for the statute was Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960). 
143. See POMP, supra note 28, at 9-133-34. 
144. See id. This approach is sometimes known as attributional nexus. The term attributional nexus is 
misleading because all nexus is “attributional” in some sense. For example, a corporation is a legal 
construct. It acts through the actions of others; these actions are “attributed” to the corporation. 
145. Colorado was the first state to adopt this approach, which was upheld in Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. 
Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016). See supra note 1. Around 12 states have followed Colorado’s 
lead. POMP, supra note 28, at 9-158. 
146. 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 64H.1.7 (2018). It was recently reported that Ohio would replace its 
cookie nexus with an economic nexus bill. Jad Chamseddine, Ohio Looking to Replace Cookie Nexus 
with Economic Nexus Regime, STATE TAX NOTES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.coc/editors-
pick/ohio-looking-replace-cookie-nexus-economic-nexus-regime. Such a change is short-sighted 
should Congress reinstate the physical presence rule. Ohio’s cookie nexus law “was scheduled to take 
effect on January 1, 2018,” but was tied up in the courts in a case brought by the American Catalog 
Mailers Association. Id. The cookie nexus will be eliminated when a new bill based on Wayfair is 
adopted. See id. Ohio has adopted the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement and plans to adopt a 
statute identical to South Dakota’s. Id. 
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approaches would still be relevant. And if Congress were to adopt 
legislation reinstituting the physical presence rule, these approaches would 
be back in play. No reason exists for a state to eliminate these approaches 
just because it adopts a post-Wayfair statute similar to South Dakota’s. 
 
VI. FOREIGN REMOTE VENDORS: A NON-PROBLEM? 
 
Quill provided remote vendors with a safe harbor, albeit one built 
around the tax avoidance of their customers. Quill’s Commerce Clause 
nexus requirement of a physical presence “serve[d] as a judicially created 
tax shelter.”147 Remote vendors had the security of knowing that without a 
physical presence in the market state, whether they were foreign (i.e., 
incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction) or domestic, they did not have to 
collect that state’s use tax. After Wayfair, both foreign and domestic 
remote vendors without a physical presence are now obligated to collect 
the use tax provided they satisfy the market state’s constitutionally 
acceptable rules on nexus, which may be expressed in terms of their gross 
receipts or number of transactions in such state or both combined. 
A major difference between foreign and domestic remote vendors 
would arise, however, if the former fails to collect. The state would, like in 
the domestic situation, issue a jeopardy assessment, and reduce that to a 
judgment. One major difference is that a state judgment can be enforced in 
another state under the U.S. Constitution’s full faith and credit clause,148 
but nothing similar exists in the foreign realm. 
Consider, for example, a Chinese-based remote vendor with no physical 
presence in the market state, but one that met that state’s post-Wayfair 
nexus rules. Assume this vendor purposely does not collect the use tax. 
Now what? 
Unless the vendor has assets that can be seized, the state would have to 
get its judgment enforced in a foreign court, notwithstanding the hoary 
 
147. South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2094 (2018). 
148. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (providing that, “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by 
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and 
the Effect thereof.”); see also Unif. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (revised 1964), 13 Part I 
U.L.A. 155 (2002). Nothing equivalent exists among foreign countries.  
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rule that “no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another.”149 
And should today’s tariff wars still be raging, this hoary rule will be even 
more respected by foreign countries. To be sure, that rule has been 
superseded by an extensive network of income tax treaties between the 
United States and many foreign countries,150 but these are limited to 
federal income taxes (with minor exceptions),151and generally have no 
impact on state sales or use taxes.  
If a foreign vendor has assets in the United States, such as inventory  at 
a distribution center, the assets can be seized to satisfy a state judgment. 
But do foreign vendors intent on tax evasion need inventory in the United 
States to service our market? A foreign vendor wanting no assets in the 
country might use distribution facilities in Mexico or Canada to service the 
United States. If necessary, a foreign vendor selling downloadable 
intangible property might use a server located in either Mexico or Canada, 
or perhaps lease capacity on a space satellite.  
These strategies are not cost-free, and may trigger, for example, 
Mexican or Canadian taxes, or incur other transaction costs, which would 
outweigh the perceived competitive advantages of not collecting the use 
tax. Moreover, running up penalties and interest, plus the taxes owed, 
might not be in the interests of a remote vendor that will be the subject of 
some third party’s due diligence one day, such as that of a possible 
creditor or buyer.152 Buyers want to avoid successor liability provisions 
that most states have. A buyer will want the vendor to clear up back 
arrears, which would include not only the amount of use tax not collected, 
 
149. Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775). See Brian J. Kirkell & Mo Bell-
Jacobs, E-Flight Risk? Wayfair and the Revenue Rule, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 551 (2018). 
150. See United States Income Tax Treaties A-Z, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov 
/businesses/international-businesses/united-states-income-tax-treaties-a-to-z (last visited Jan. 4, 2019). 
151. For one exception, see Convention Between the United States of America and the Federal 
Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain other Taxes, Ger.-U.S., art. XXIV, Aug. 29, 
1989, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/germany.pdf. This non-discrimination paragraph would seem to 
add nothing to the protections already provided by the U.S. Constitution’s Foreign Commerce Clause. 
Nonetheless, a treaty party not familiar with the protection provided by the Foreign Commerce Clause 
might prefer an explicit treaty provision promising non-discrimination. 
152. See generally Kirkell & Bell-Jacobs, supra note 149. The problem of arrears is not limited to 
foreign vendors. U.S. remote vendors having a pre-Wayfair physical presence have not always 
collected sales taxes when they should have. Presumably, these vendors will start collecting going 
forward. At some point, their earlier sins will be washed out. 
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but also any relevant interest and penalties. And if no return has ever been 
filed, a statute of limitations will not start running. 
Foreign vendors that use U.S. banks to process credit card purchases 
might also be vulnerable to having their accounts seized to satisfy a 
market state’s judgment. Internal Revenue Code Section 6050W(c)(2) 
requires that banks and merchant services report to the IRS annual gross 
payments processed by credit cards and/or debit cards, as well as to the 
merchants that received them. Credit card payments are reported on Form 
1099-K.153 Merchants must provide the payment processor with the full 
legal name of their businesses, their addresses, and their taxpayer 
identification numbers (EIN).154 If no EIN exists, the merchant could 
become subject to backup withholding at a rate of 28 percent.155  
Section 6050W(c)(2) should facilitate collection under a warrant issued 
by a state to collect on its judgment. Foreign vendors anticipating this 
problem might attempt evasive action by ceasing all contacts with the 
United States,156 which could be difficult because U.S. purchasers will 
 
153. Form 1099-K is authorized under I.R.C. § 6050W (2018). A 1099 is required when the amount 
paid exceeds $20,000 and the vendor has engaged in more than 200 transactions. “The IRS routinely 
shares information with the states, and once the state tax department gets access to the 1099-K, it could 
assess tax on amounts due to the vendor from the payment processor.” Glenn Newman, Offshore 
Online Retailers Can’t Hide from Sales Tax Collection, 92 TAX NOTES INT’L 1309, 1310 (2018). The 
federal reference to 200 transactions might have influenced the South Dakota threshold of 200 
transactions. I am indebted to Glen Newman of Greenberg Traurig and Steve Wlodychak of Ernst & 
Young for their perceptive comments on this part of the Article. 
154. According to a well-known practitioner, “credit card companies and other payment processors 
generally require a federal employer identification number (FEIN) and a depository bank to set up a 
merchant account to facilitate credit card payments. Collecting a tax delinquency from a bank account 
is relatively simple for tax authorities once they identify a taxpayer by FEIN.” Id., at 1310. 
155. I.R.C. §§ 3406(a)(1), (b)(3)(F) (2018). 
156. Because of the physical presence rule, foreign vendors previously did not have to obtain state 
sales tax permits. Now they do. But  
[o]btaining a state sales tax permit can be tricky for foreign sellers. Many states require a 
federally assigned taxpayer identification number, which can only be obtained through the 
IRS. Foreign entities are reluctant to contact the Service for fear of having their identities 
permanently embedded in IRS computer databases, which might later be shared with tax 
administrators in their home countries. Most states also require that sales tax payments be 
made using an Automated Clearing House transfer from a U.S. bank. Foreign entities prefer 
to avoid the U.S. banking system when possible. Programs like the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act and common reporting standard have succeeded in making people financially 
paranoid. 
Goulder, supra note 139, at 320. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
POMP ARTICLE   6/24/19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 58:01 
 
 
more than likely have credit cards issued by U.S. banks. And whatever 
such action might be, it would drive up the cost of noncompliance.157 
Another possible avenue of collection would be for the U.S. Customs 
Bureau to seize packages at airports and docks sent from vendors having 
outstanding judgments, but this seems Pollyannaish. Foreign shippers 
could use aliases or shell companies on shipping documents to thwart 
these efforts.158 
The problem of recalcitrant foreign vendors would be avoided for sales 
taking place on major platforms, like Amazon.com, Alibaba, Target.com, 
Etsy, eBay, or Walmart.com in states requiring the collection of use taxes 
on all third-party sales.159 These so-called marketplace facilitator laws, 
which vary in detail, have been enacted by Alabama, Connecticut, Iowa, 
 
157. If a vendor does not collect the New York sales tax, the state “has a couple of courses.” Hoke, 
supra note 134 (quoting a practitioner, Christopher Doyle, who states that “New York could issue a 
warrant creating a lien and have the warrant domesticated in the state where the business is 
domiciled.” Doyle additionally noted that: 
Frankly, New York is not great at collecting against folks and businesses outside of New 
York . . .It’s more about wrecking your credit rating or having this lien out there unsatisfied. 
If you want to sell your business, it would likely have to be disclosed. . . if there’s property 
that’s held in the U.S. by somebody that has enough of a connection in New York that is 
subject to New York’s long-arm authority, New York can claim that property in satisfaction 
of the warrant. . . Many foreign banks have facilities in New York City, so New York can 
levy on any cash in the bank account of the business by levying on that bank. 
158. These strategies are commonly used to evade United States sanction. See, e.g., Colum Lynch, 
U.N. Report Details How North Korea Evades Sanctions, FOREIGN POLICY (Sep. 20, 2018), 
https://fore 
ignpolicy.com/2018/09/20/un-report-details-how-north-korea-evades-sanctions/; North Korea Evades 
Sanctions with Ships That Change Names, SYRACUSE (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.syracuse.com/us-
ne 
ws/index.ssf/2018/02/north_korea_evades_sanctions_with_ships_that_change_names.html; Krishadev 
Calamur, How North Korea Cheats Sanctions, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.c 
om/international/archive/2017/08/north-korea-cheats-sanctions/536169/. 
159. Amy Hamilton, Hamer Identifies Ways to Collect Use Tax Owed by Foreign Sellers, STATE 
TAX NOTES, (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/online-sales-taxation/hamer-
identifie 
s-ways-collect-use-tax-owed-foreign-sellers/2018/11/05/28kvj. It was reported that more than half of 
Amazon.com’s annual retail sales are made by third-party sellers over the marketplace platform. Amy 
Hamilton, Amazon Marketplace Collection Trial Underway in South Carolina, STATE TAX NOTES 
(Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/litigation-and-appeals/amazon-marketplace-
collecti 
on-trial-underway-south carolina/2019/02/05/293qp?highlight=amazon%20marketplace%20collection 
%20trial. 
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Minnesota, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, and Washington, with many more in the drafting stage.160 The 
major marketplace facilitators seem to be complying with these statutes—
at least for now.161 This type of legislation can be expected to be widely 
 
160. See, e.g., H.B. 1002, 92nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019); H.B. 276, 2019-2020 Reg. 
Sess. (Ga. 2019); S.B. 396/S.D. 1, 30th Leg. (Haw. 2019); H.B. 1352, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (Ind. 2019); S.B. 322, 121st Gen. Assemb. 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019); S.B. 22, 2019 Reg. Sess. 
(Kan. 2019); H.B. 354, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2019); S.B. 728, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019); H. 1, S. 
1637, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019); H.B. 548, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019); L.B. 
284, 106th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2019); H.B. 6, 2019 Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019); A. 3347, 2019 
Assemb. (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 2338, 66th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2019); S.B. 890, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. S. 
214 (Tex. 2019); S.B. 168, 2019 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019); H. 117, 2019 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2019); H.B. 
1722, 2019 Gen. Assemb. Sess. (Va. 2019); S.B. 1083, 2019 Gen. Assemb. Sess. (Va. 2019); H.B. 
2813, 84th Leg., 1st Sess. (W. Va. 2019); S.B. 477, 84th Leg., 1st Sess. (W. Va. 2019); H.B. 69, 65th 
Leg., 2019 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019); see also POMP, supra note 28, at 9-137-148. Washington and 
Rhode Island allow marketplace facilitators the option of either collecting the tax or following notice 
and reporting obligations. New measures in both states would eliminate the option and require 
collection. Amy Hamilton, Marketplace Facilitator Legislation Pending in Almost Half the States, 
STATE TAX NOTES (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/marketplace-
facilitators/marketplace-facilitator-bills-pending-almost-half-
states/2019/03/11/296x2?highlight=Marketplace%20Facilitator%20Legislation%20Pending%20in%20
Almost%20Half%20the%20States. One report indicates that marketplace facilitator legislation is 
pending in almost half the states. Id. South Carolina and Louisiana are attempting to apply existing 
statutes to reach the same result as platform legislation. See infra note 163. 
161. Calhoun & Kolarik, supra note 33, at 134 (“Nor is it clear whether a state may compel the 
marketplace facilitator to collect and remit use tax for its client, the remote seller.”). One of the 
reasons for the lack of litigation may be that those subject to the new statutes welcome them for two 
reasons. First, the platforms will likely explicitly or implicitly charge for their newly imposed 
collection obligations, creating a new profit center. Second, the new laws will help level the playing 
field between the larger platforms, e.g., Amazon, quite capable of collecting on behalf of their third 
party sellers because of their experience collecting on their own sales, and their competitors, like eBay, 
which do not have the same experience. EBay has only recently started to collect use taxes under 
platform statutes. Ina Steiner, eBay Starts Collecting Sales Tax with More States to Come, 
ECOMMERCE BYTES (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.ecommercebytes.com/2019/01/04/ebay-starts-
collecting-sales-tax-with-more-states 
-to-come/. EBay is reported as collecting in three states under their platform legislation but will collect 
in eight states as of July 1, 2019. Amazon is currently collecting in eight states under such legislation. 
Amazon apparently negotiated an agreement with Mississippi under which it will not be required to 
collect on behalf of third parties. Amazon has an agreement with Massachusetts under which it turns 
over data on third-party sellers that have sales and inventory in the state. Aaron Davis, Online Sellers 
Crowdsource Sales Tax Compliance, STATE TAX NOTES (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/online-sales-taxation/online-sellers-crowdsource-sales-tax-
compliance-
advice/2019/02/19/294w9?highlight=Online%20Sellers%20Crowdsource%20Sales%20Tax%20Comp
liance. By the end of 2019, Etsy will be collecting in Washington, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, 
Minnesota, Iowa, Connecticut, South Carolina, South Dakota, Alabama, New Jersey, and the District 
of Columbia. Paul Jones, Etsy Lists States Where it Collects Tax, STATE TAX NOTES (Jan. 23, 2019), 
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adopted.162 Once a state adopts such legislation, a foreign vendor selling 
over a platform will have nowhere to hide.163 
To be sure, some foreign vendors might have their own websites and 
not sell exclusively over a platform. For these, the other techniques above 
would be necessary. Possibly public opinion might turn against non-
collectors, especially if they are based in countries that are viewed as bete 
noirs, and the fear of a consumer boycott164 might convince foreign remote 
vendors that the preferred business model is in fact is to collect the 
applicable use taxes. 
In short, whether foreign vendors really present a meaningful threat of 
non-compliance calling for federal intervention is an empirical question 
(complicated politically if a foreign sovereign fund might be involved),165 
but perhaps only a time-limited one as marketplace facilitator legislation 
becomes more commonplace.166 Realistically, the fear of noncompliance 
 
https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/ssuta/etsy-releases-list-states-where-it-collects-sales-
taxes/2019/01/23/292lj?highlight=etsy. 
 Many states have an exemption from their sales taxes for “casual sales.” See POMP, supra note 
28, at 6-12; Richard D. Pomp & Oliver Oldman, A Normative Inquiry into the Base of a Retail Sales 
Tax, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 427 (1990), reprinted in 1 STATE TAX NOTES 170 (1991). Some sales on eBay, 
for example, would be exempt as a casual sale. How a marketplace facilitator should take this into 
account is an issue for the states to resolve through legislation or administrative guidance. See infra 
note 162. 
162. The Multistate Tax Commission has provided useful guidance for the states. See Wayfair 
Implementation and Marketplace Facilitator Work Group, MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, 
http://www.mtc.gov/UniUniUnif/Project-Teams/Wayfair-Implementation-Informational-Project (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2019); see generally, Robert D. Plattner, MTC Issues White Paper on Drafting 
‘Marketplace Legislation’, 91 STATE TAX NOTES 155 (2019); Tom Yamachika, The Next Wayfair 
Frontier: Online Marketplaces, 91 STATE TAX NOTES 165 (2019). 
163. A few states not having platform legislation are interpreting their existing statues as requiring 
the platform to collect on their third-party sales. South Carolina is involved in such litigation with 
Amazon, and a Louisiana parish is involved in litigation with Walmart. See Alex Hartley, Exclusive: 
US State Drags Amazon to Court on Platform Sales Tax Liability, INT’L TAX REV. (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3859388/Exclusive-US-state-drags-Amazon-to-court-
on-platform-sales-tax-liability.html?ArticleId=3859388; Normand v. Wal-Mart.com USA LLC, No. 
18-CA-211, 2018 WL 6803175 (La. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2018); Andrea Muse, Walmart Faces 
Procedural Challenges in Louisiana Marketplace Suit, STATE TAX NOTES (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/litigation-and-appeals/walmart-faces-procedural-challenge-
louisiana-marketplace-suit/2019/03/06/296jz?highlight=Walmart%20Marketplace%20Suit. 
164. Of course, such a boycott would be against the self-interests of consumers. 
165. I leave for another day any possible Foreign Commerce Clause or Import-Export Clause 
problems.  
166. See Darien Shanske, David Gamage, & Adam Thimmesch, Wayfair: Marketplaces and Foreign 
Vendors, 90 STATE TAX NOTES 111 (2018). Gamage, Shanske, and Thimmesch also do not view the 
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by remote foreign vendors appears exaggerated, especially because the 
competitive advantage of not collecting seems outweighed by the 
downside risks and costs. As this article goes to press in early 2019, there 
are no reports of non-collection by foreign vendors. 
Little attention has been directed at a concomitant problem of a foreign 
vendor collecting a state’s use tax but not remitting the proceeds. 
Hopefully, this lack of attention means no problem exists. In any event, 
the widespread adoption of platform statutes167 will solve this potential 
problem. 
Shortly after Wayfair was issued on June 21, 2018, I and other state tax 
lawyers started receiving inquiries from lawyers acting on behalf of 
foreign vendors posing the question of what would happen if their clients 
did not collect the use tax, but such calls do not necessarily mean an actual 
threat is looming. Lawyers might have raised this issue merely because 
they were anticipating potential questions from their clients. Or even if a 
client posed the question, it might have been more in the nature of tax 
managers wanting an answer to a question they anticipated being asked 
from an executive, who in turn was merely covering all of his or her bases. 
Lawyers are used to fielding questions more in the nature of “we have to 
check this box,” and never receive any follow up to their answers, and 
never see any evidence that their answers made a difference to anyone’s 
behavior.168 
 
VII. STATE REACTIONS TO WAYFAIR 
 
The Supreme Court did not rule that the South Dakota statute was 
 
risk of foreign evasion as serious, although not for all the reasons suggested in the text. Id. I hope we 
are correct. 
167. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
168. For example, tax practitioners often are asked to “cost out” the state tax consequences of 
locating a facility in various competing states. Just because the question was posed does not mean that 
the answers will actually drive the locational decision, which is an exceedingly complicated one. But 
the answers are important defensively, that is, if the CEO asks the question, the tax manager better 
have an answer, even if the answer does not drive the decision. So why did the CEO ask at all if the 
answer is not going to drive the decision? Because the Board of Directors might ask whether the 
corporation had determined that there was nothing aberrational about the tax structure of the 
competing states. Replying that that had not yet been done is unacceptable. In short, all sorts of 
questions get asked of lawyers by their larger clients that are defensive or anticipatory in nature.  
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constitutional; it only eliminated the physical presence standard. 
Nonetheless, the Court looked favorably on three elements of the law: the 
use of thresholds; the prohibition against retroactive liability; and the 
State’s adoption of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement 
(“Agreement”). States have rushed to embrace the first two of these 
elements—politically, the third is trickier.  
 
A. State Changes 
 
The following list, likely to have changed by the time the Journal 
publishes this article, includes post-Wayfair changes by the states:  
 
State Effective Date 
Gross 
Receipts 
# of Trans-
actions Source 
Alabama 10/1/18 $250,000 N/a 
DOR Guidance: 
https://revenue.alabama.gov/2
018/07/03/ador-announces-
sales-and-use-tax-guidance-
for-online-sellers/. 
Alaska N/a N/a N/a AK does not impose a sale or use tax.169 
Arizona N/a N/a N/a AZ has not made any changes post-Wayfair 
Arkansas TBD $100,000 200 Draft bill would set these thresholds. H.B. 1002 (2018). 
 
169.  The Alaska Municipal League is working with local governments to require sales and use tax 
compliance by remote vendors through the creation of a centralized system for collecting and 
distributing the revenue to the local jurisdictions. Paul Jones, Cities, Boroughs Pursuing Remote Sales 
Tax Collection, STATE TAX NOTES (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-
today/jurisdiction-tax/alaska-localities-pursuing-remote-sales-tax-collection/2019/01/28/292y8. 
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State Effective Date 
Gross 
Receipts 
# of Trans-
actions Source 
California 4/1/19 $100,000 200 
Department of Tax and Fee 
Administration Special 
Notice:  
https://www.cdtfa.ca.gov/taxe
s-and-fees/L565.pdf. 
California A.B. 147 would 
require $500,000 in annual 
sales into the State by remote 
sellers or online marketplace 
providers, without regard to 
the number of transactions. 
The Assembly Appropriations 
Committee approved the 
measure on March 6, 2019. 
Colorado 12/1/18 $100,000 200 
Grace period provided 
through May 31, 2019 for 
retailers to make systems 
changes. Emergency 
Regulation Tracking Number: 
2018-00692. 
Connecticut 12/1/18 $250,000 200 Both thresholds must be met. Public Act No. 18-152. 
DC 1/1/19 $100,000 200 Internet Sales Tax Emergency Amendment Act of 2018. 
Delaware N/A N/A N/A DE does not impose a statewide sales or use tax. 
Florida N/A N/A N/A FL has not made any post Wayfair changes. 
Georgia 1/1/19 $250,000 200 
If retailer chooses not to 
collect, then they must 
comply with the notice and 
reporting requirements. 2018 
Georgia House Bill 61. 
Hawaii 7/1/18 $100,000 200 Department of Taxation Announcement No. 2018-10. 
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State Effective Date 
Gross 
Receipts 
# of Trans-
actions Source 
Idaho N/A N/A N/A 
ID has not made any post 
Wayfair changes. However, a 
new law (House Bill 578) 
requires an out-of-state 
retailer to collect sales tax on 
sales to Idaho customers 
when (1) total sales to Idaho 
buyers exceeded $10,000 in 
the previous year, and (2) the 
out-of-state seller has an 
agreement with an Idaho 
retailer to refer potential 
buyers to the out-of-state 
seller for a commission. This 
law went into effect on July 
1, 2018. 
Illinois 10/1/18 $100,000 200 Bulletin FY 2019-05. Illinois Public Act 100-587. 
Indiana 10/1/18 $100,000 200 House Enrolled Act No. 1129. 
Iowa 1/1/19 $100,000 200 Senate File 2417. 
Kansas N/A N/A N/A KS has not made any post Wayfair changes. 
Kentucky 10/1/18 $100,000 200 House Bill 487. 
Louisiana 1/1/19 $100,000 200 
Remote Sellers Information 
Bulletin No. 18-001. LA R.S. 
47:301(4)(m). 
Maine 7/1/18 $100,000 200 36 M.R.S. § 1951-B. 
Maryland 10/1/18 $100,000 200 COMAR § 03.06.01.33170 
Massachu-
setts 10/1/17 $500,000 100 
Both thresholds must be met. 
830 CMR 64H.1.7. 
Michigan 10/1/18 $100,000 200 Revenue Administrative Bulletin 2018-16. 
Minnesota 10/1/18 $100,000 100 
Gross receipts threshold must 
be met through at least 10 
sales. Minn. Stat. § 297A.66.  
Mississippi 9/1/18 $250,000 N/A CMSR 35-004-003171 
 
170.  H.B. 811, the Sales Tax Reform Act of 2019 would codify these existing regulations. Lauren 
Loricchio, Bill Would Codify Post-Wayfair Regulations, STATE TAX NOTES (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/sales-and-use-taxation/maryland-bill-would-codify-post-
wayfair-regs/2019/02/12/2949p. 
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State Effective Date 
Gross 
Receipts 
# of Trans-
actions Source 
Missouri N/A N/A N/A MO has not made any post Wayfair changes. 
Montana N/A N/A N/A MT does not impose a statewide sales or use tax. 
Nebraska 1/1/19 $100,000 200 
DOR Guidance: 
http://www.revenue.nebraska.
gov/news_rel/jul_18/wayfair.
pdf 
Nevada 10/1/18 $100,000 200 LCB File No. R189-18. 
New 
Hampshire N/A N/A N/A 
NH does not impose a 
statewide sales or use tax. 
New Jersey 11/1/18 $100,000 200 N.J. Stat. § 54:32B-3.5. 
New Mexico N/A N/A N/A NM has not made any post Wayfair changes. 
New York Pre-existing $300,000 100 
The Deputy Counsel of the 
New York State Department 
refers to longstanding NY tax 
law that asserts nexus is 
established if property 
delivered into the state 
exceeds $300,000 and if more 
than 100 sales of property 
were delivered in NY. N.Y. 
Tax Law § 1101(b)(8)(i)(E) 
and N.Y. Tax Law § 
1101(b)(8)(iv). 172 
North 
Carolina 11/1/18 $100,000 200 
DOR Directive Number SD-
18-6. 
 
171.  There are six bills dealing with Wayfair. All would impose the $100,000/200 transaction 
thresholds. Aaron Davis, Six Remote Sales Tax Bills Vie for Success, STATE TAX NOTES (Feb. 4, 
2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/ssuta/six-remote-sales-tax-bills-vie-success-
missouri/2019/02/04/293mg. One of these bills uses the resulting revenue to reduce the state’s top 
income tax rate from 6% to 5.5%, with additional reduction in future years. Id; see supra note 139. 
172.  See Joseph N. Endres & Timothy P. Noonan, New York Had Wayfair Guidance All Along!, 91 
STATE TAX NOTES 481 (2019). 
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State Effective Date 
Gross 
Receipts 
# of Trans-
actions Source 
North 
Dakota 10/1/18 $100,000 200 
Begin collecting October 1, 
2018, or 60 days after 
meeting the threshold, 
whichever is later. DOR 
Guidance: 
https://www.nd.gov/tax/remot
eseller/. 
Ohio 1/1/18 $500,000  N/A 
Seller must use in-state 
software to sell or lease 
taxable property or services; 
or provides or enters into 
agreement with another 
person to provide a content 
distribution network. Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 5741.01. 
Oklahoma 7/1/18 $10,000  N/A  Okla. Stat. tit. 68 § 1392. 
Oregon N/A N/A N/A OR does not impose a statewide sales or use tax. 
Pennsylvani
a 4/1/18 $10,000  N/A 
If retailer chooses not to 
collect, then they must 
comply with the notice and 
reporting requirements. 72 
PA. Cons. Stat. § 7213.1. 173 
Rhode 
Island 8/17/17 $100,000  200 
If retailer chooses not to 
collect, then they must 
comply with the notice and 
reporting requirements. 44 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 18.2-3. 
South 
Carolina 11/1/18 $100,000  N/A Revenue Ruling #18-14. 
South 
Dakota 11/1/18 $100,000  200 
S.D. Codified Laws § 10-64-2 
(2018). 
 
173.  The Pennsylvania Department of Revenue recently published an alert warning residents that 
notices from marketplace facilitators to them about the use tax are not a scam. Paige Jones, 
Pennsylvania DOR Alerts Taxpayers to Marketplace Sales Tax Obligations, STATE TAX NOTES (Feb. 
11, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/online-sales-taxation/pennsylvania-dor-alerts-
taxpayers-marketplace-sales-tax-
obligations/2019/02/11/2949g?highlight=DOR%20alerts%20taxpayers. 
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State Effective Date 
Gross 
Receipts 
# of Trans-
actions Source 
Tennessee TBD $500,000  N/A 
On hold until further 
guidance from the DOR. 
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 
1320-05-01-.129; DOR 
Notice #18-11. 174 
Texas  1/1/2019 $500,000  N/A 
Texas Comptroller of Public 
Accounts released proposed 
amendments to Rule Section 
3.286 that would set the gross 
receipts threshold. 
Utah 1/1/19 $100,000  200 Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107. 
Vermont 7/1/18 $100,000  200 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 9701. 
Virginia N/A N/A N/A 
Wayfair guidance not 
expected until 2019. 
https://www.bna.com/state-
wayfair-virginia-
n57982093393/ 
Washington 10/1/18 $100,000  200 
DOR Guidance: 
https://dor.wa.gov/find-taxes-
rates/retail-sales-
tax/marketplace-fairness-
leveling-playing-
field/registration-thresholds-
out-state-businesses-retail-
sales. 
West 
Virginia 
 1/1/201
9 $100,000  200 
Administrative Notice 2018-
18. 
Wisconsin 10/1/18 $100,000  200 
Emergency Rule 1819. A 
permanent rule is being 
considered. 
Wyoming 2/1/19 $100,000  200 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-15-501 (2018). 175 
 
174.  The Department of Revenue adopted Rule 129 in 2016 requiring out-of-state sellers with more 
than $500,000 in sales into the state during the previous 12-month period to collect sales and use taxes 
by July 1, 2017. In that year, H.B. 261 was passed prohibiting the Department from collecting sales 
taxes under Rule 129 until the General Assembly reviews any court ruling authorizing the collection of 
sales and use taxes from remote sellers and approves the rule. That review has not yet occurred. 
Andrea Muse, Bill Would Expand Economic Nexus, STATE TAX NOTES (Feb. 18, 2019), 
https://www.taxnotes.com/st 
ate-tax-today/legislation-and-lawmaking/tennessee-bill-would-extend-economic-nexus-amusement-tax 
/2019/02/13/294dy?highlight=would%20expand%20economic%20nexus. 
175.  Paul Jones, Wyoming Remote Sales Tax Terms Take Effect, STATE TAX NOTES (Feb. 4, 2019), 
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Gross receipts in the chart above is a placeholder for different 
definitions the states have adopted. Most of the listed states use gross 
sales. Alabama, Minnesota, and Washington use retail sales. North Dakota 
and Pennsylvania use taxable sales.176 
 
B. The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (“Agreement”): To 
Adopt or Not to Adopt? 
 
Adopting the Agreement will certainly help to withstand post-Wayfair 
litigation. But politically, adopting the Agreement is not as easy as 
adopting the thresholds. Will the marginal advantages of withstanding 
post-Wayfair litigation be enough to overcome the political opposition? 
The purpose of the Agreement is to simplify and modernize sales and 
use tax administration in order to substantially reduce the burden of tax 
compliance,177 all laudable goals. The Agreement focuses on improving 
sales and use tax administration systems for all sellers and for all types of 
commerce and requires the following: 
1. State level administration of sales and use tax collections; 
2. Uniformity in the state and local tax bases; 
3. Uniformity of major tax base definitions; 
4. Central, electronic registration system for all member states; 
5. Simplification of state and local tax rates; 
6. Uniform sourcing rules for all taxable transactions;178 
7. Simplified administration of exemptions; 
8. Simplified tax returns; 
9. Simplification of tax remittances; and 
10. Protection of consumer privacy.179  
 
https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/online-sales-taxation/wyoming-remote-sales-tax-
requirements-take-
effect/2019/02/04/293mh?highlight=remote%20sales%20tax%20terms%20take%20effect. 
176. Roxanne Bland, South Dakota v. Wayfair: The Fallout, 90 STATE TAX NOTES 621 (2018). See 
supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
177. About Us, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/abo 
ut-us/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).  
178. States that have not adopted the Agreement may have different sourcing rules that can be 
problematic. For a situation where a difference in sourcing rules can lead to double taxation, see Garry 
G. Fujita, What Happens Now Without Quill, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 751 (2018). See also infra Part IX. 
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Wayfair obviously provides a push for states to adopt the Agreement. 
Two questions arise: why haven’t states already adopted the Agreement, 
even pre-Wayfair, and why won’t they rush to do so post-Wayfair? The 
short answer is that many states are unwilling--or unable--to make the 
changes in their sales tax statutes that adopting the Agreement would 
require. 
Especially troublesome are the Agreement’s requirements of a single, 
state-level tax administration in a state with numerous local sales taxes, 
uniform definitions of products and services in a state with numerous 
carve outs and exemptions, simplified tax rate structures and other uniform 
rules, access to sales tax administration software180 paid for by the state, 
and immunity from audit liability.  
For example, a state that has favorable rules on certain types of 
purchases might face a severe pushback if those rules were to be 
changed.181 The same political forces that were powerful enough to have 
had such rules enacted in the first place will lobby to protect them. 
Nonetheless, states could adopt some of the features that impressed the 
Wayfair Court on their own, such as the thresholds and the lack of 
retroactivity, and selected features of the Agreement, while stopping short 
of adopting the Agreement in full. 
The Agreement has not been adopted by the larger population states. 
Ohio, the seventh largest state by population, is the most populous state 
that has adopted it. The six more populous states than Ohio make up 
around 40% of the population. The 23 states that have adopted the 
 
179. See STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., supra note 177. 
180. Sometimes free software, like a free puppy, can be expensive going forward. In the case of the 
former, there is the cost of integrating the software with a vendor’s existing accounting systems. And 
the mapping issue can be formidable. See Kristin Korpos, Mapping Your Products in an Automated 
Tax System, INTUIT, https://quickbooks.intuit.com/r/sales-tax/mapping-your-products-in-an-automated 
-tax-system/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019). One of the issues in designing legislation to require a 
platform provider like Amazon to collect the market states’ use tax for third parties is who should have 
the responsibility for doing the mapping. See supra note 162. 
181. I was on a Connecticut Commission to consider adopting the Agreement. While I favored 
adoption, the majority did not, essentially because it would require changing Connecticut’s clothing 
exemption (since eliminated). Recently, however, the House of Representatives introduced H.B. 6270, 
requiring Connecticut to change its laws to bring the State into compliance with the Streamlined Sales 
and Use Tax Agreement. The bill has been referred to the Joint Committee on Finance, Revenue, and 
Bonding. A hearing was held on February 13, 2019. 
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Agreement in full182 represent only around 30% of the U.S. population. 
One of the problems is that these larger states have well-organized and 
substantial groups of lobbyists protecting their constituents from the 
changes that would be mandated by the Agreement. A state like Texas, for 
example, has more than 100 sales tax definitions that would have to be 
changed if it were to adopt the Agreement; South Dakota had far fewer. I 
do not expect to see a rash of adoptions in order to receive Wayfair’s 
blessing.183 
 
C. Designing Remote Vendor Collection Statutes 
 
1. Sales Threshold 
 
A number of considerations should enter into setting a sales threshold. 
A state might use the threshold to eliminate low-tax returns whose 
administrative costs cannot be justified by the amount of tax at stake, 
reflecting a rough “de minimis” philosophy. The threshold might also be 
set to discourage litigation by culling low-volume vendors whose 
compliance costs might be many times their profits on their sales.184 A 
state might also consider how onerous are its compliance burdens and its 
inability or refusal to simplify its rules. Finally, the concept of “substantial 
privilege of carrying on business” in a high population state might require 
a higher threshold than in a state like South Dakota. The higher the 
 
182. The 23 full member states are Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
Tennessee is an associate member. See STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., 
https://www.streamlinedsalest 
ax.org/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019). No state has joined since 2014. The most likely states to join in the 
short-term are Missouri and Tennessee (which is only an associate member at present). See Michael J. 
Bologna, Large States Remain Cynical About Streamlined Sales Tax Pact, BLOOMBERG TAX (Jan. 18, 
2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-state/large-states-remain-cynical-about-streaml 
ined-sales-tax-pact. 
183. The Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board admitted it “hasn’t had much success persuading 
other states to join.” Jad Chamseddine, Governing Board to Continue Outreach to Nonmember States, 
STATE TAX NOTES (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/ssuta/governing-board-
continue-outreach-ssuta-nonmember-states/2018/10/04/28h3l?highlight=governing%20board%20to% 
20continue%20outreach.  
184. See infra notes 198, 267-70, and accompanying text. 
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threshold, the more likely a state statute will survive a judicial 
challenge.185 But setting the threshold too high would be unfair to in-state 
merchants in competition with remote vendors.186 The minimum number 
of transactions, if that were to be kept as part of the threshold tests,187 
raises similar considerations.  
Anti-avoidance rules need to be considered to deal with vendors that 
restructure themselves into multiple entities to keep each one’s sales 
below the threshold, a problem that also exists in the case of the 
transaction threshold.188 Too high a threshold exacerbates this problem. 
This problem is not new. Early in the days of the federal corporate 
income tax, Congress adopted a statute189 “to curb the abuse of multiple 
incorporation”190 to avoid the tax’s marginal rates. Other common law 
doctrines were also available to supplement the statute.191 Some of these 
anti-avoidance approaches might, with some tweaking, be incorporated 
into state law. 
The definition of sales a state adopts should sweep broadly192 and 
include transactions that might not be taxable. These transactions could 
include inter alia exempt sales for resale,193 goods that would become 
ingredients and components of tangible personal property, sales to non-
profits, and casual sales.194 Consequently, not every transaction satisfying 
 
185. These arguments lose force in the case of platforms collecting taxes on behalf of those selling 
on them. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
186. A question for another day is whether states should consider exempting from the sales tax-low 
volume, in-state, brick and mortar vendors, a practice common in value added taxes. All VATs have a 
registration threshold. A vendor below the threshold (1) pays a VAT on purchases, (2) does not collect 
the VAT on re-sale, and (3) does not file a VAT return. Thresholds are based on gross sales; special 
rules apply to imports. I thank William Lasher of eBay and Richard Ainsworth of Boston University 
Law School for educating me on this point. Some commentators have called for national uniform 
threshold post-Wayfair but apparently not for in-state vendors. See, e.g., Joel Busch, The Case for a 
Uniform Threshold for use Tax Nexus Post-Wayfair, 91 STATE TAX NOTES 495 (2019). 
187. I argue below that a state should consider requiring that both the transaction and the sales 
thresholds be satisfied before a remote vendor has nexus. See infra notes 201-07 and accompanying 
text. 
188. See infra Part VII.C.2. 
189. I.R.C. § 1561 (2018). 
190. U.S. v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26 (1982). 
191. See generally Patrick G. Dooher, Multiple Corporations, Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) No. 55-
5th (1986). 
192. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
193. See POMP, supra note 28, at 7-33-34. 
194. Id. at 7-65-66; supra note 161.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
POMP ARTICLE   6/24/19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 58:01 
 
 
the threshold will necessarily result in a sales tax. Nonetheless, sweeping 
broadly by including all sales, whether taxable or not, flushes out all 
vendors and allows the tax department to make a case-by-case 
determination regarding the status of a transaction.195  
The South Dakota statute does not define what constitutes a South 
Dakota sale, leaving that to the existing statute and regulations. In the case 
of local brick and mortar stores, the question is trivial. The new question is 
whether existing definitions and rules will work well when applied to an 
influx of remote vendors that previously did not have to file any returns. 
Little constitutional jurisprudence exists on what constitutes a sale within 
the meaning of a sales tax.196 Services and intangible property can raise 
knotty issues as we have seen in the context of state corporate income 
taxes and market-based sourcing.197 
 
2. Transaction Threshold 
 
The “transactions” threshold (200 transactions) is used by South Dakota 
as an alternative to the amount of sales threshold ($100,000). One problem 
is that nexus can be created for a low-profit vendor slightly above the 
transaction threshold. Consider, for example, a remote vendor making 201 
$5 transactions, totaling $1,005. The costs of compliance may totally 
overwhelm the profit margin on these sales. Why should this vendor have 
to collect the use tax (even if the software is provided free)?198 Perhaps 
this was the type of situation the Court was alluding to when it deferred to 
the Pike balancing test to deal with problems yet to emerge.199 
Thought has to be given to the definition of “transaction.” If I ship an 
accounting firm pursuant to its order 201 copies of my casebook in a bulk 
 
195. I have defended the virtues of this approach in other contexts. See, e.g., RICHARD D. POMP, 
REPORT OF THE HEARING OFFICER: MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT ARTICLE IV PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS 46 (2013). 
196. See infra Part VII.C.5. 
197. See POMP, supra note 195, at 54-94. 
198. See supra note 180. The thresholds in general are unfair to small in-state stores in competition 
with remote vendors, an argument that is more serious as the thresholds increase. See supra note 186 
and accompanying text. The transaction threshold can also be cumbersome for remote vendors whose 
software, in my experience, does not track the number of transactions into a state. 
199. For a discussion of Pike balancing, see infra Part VIII. The amounts in the text would hardly 
justify a vendor litigating the issue by itself rather than as part of a consortium or class action. 
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mailing is that one transaction or 201? Is that situation any different from 
shipping 201 copies to 201 individual purchasers in that same state? And 
as discussed above, anti-avoidance rules need to be considered to deal with 
vendors that restructure themselves into multiple entities to keep each one 
below the threshold.200  
A transaction threshold could make better sense if it must be satisfied in 
addition to the sales threshold and not as an alternative. Requiring both to 
be satisfied would deal with the following type of situation.201  
Suppose a South Dakota resident buys more than $100,000 of art from a 
gallery in New York while on vacation and has it sent back home. (New 
York does not impose a sales tax because the delivery takes place in South 
Dakota.)202 Assume the gallery has no web site, does not advertise 
nationally, and has no connection with South Dakota. Because the sales 
exceed the $100,000 threshold, the gallery would have to collect the South 
Dakota sales tax.203 
The gallery, however, is not exploiting the South Dakota marketplace,204 
and does not have the minimum contacts with the State to satisfy the Due 
Process Clause.205 Wayfair does not address this situation because it did 
not deal with the Due Process Clause.  
Nor would the gallery satisfy Wayfair’s Commerce Clause requirement 
of “avail[ing] itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business”206 
in South Dakota for the straight forward reason that it is not doing 
anything in that State. Presumably, a refund of the South Dakota sales tax 
collected by the gallery would be in order. If, however, the transaction 
threshold had to be satisfied in addition to the sales threshold, the gallery 
would not initially get caught in the South Dakota tax net and then have to 
 
200. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. 
201. The European Union is discussing the use of thresholds to define a virtual permanent 
establishment. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The International Implications of Wayfair, 91 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 161 (2018); Ryan Finley, Wayfair Decision Echoes Case for Digital PE Standard, 91 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 14 (2018). 
202. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 526.7 (2017). 
203. Or maybe not. Even putting aside the constitutional issues identified in the text, under Dilworth, 
there would be no South Dakota sale. See infra Part VII.C.5 (discussing the implications of Dilworth 
and General Trading). 
204. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-08 (1992). 
205. Id. 
206. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. For a discussion of Polar Tankers, see supra note 111. 
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try to extricate itself by seeking a refund, wasting its and the State’s 
resources. The combination of both tests would make it more likely that 
the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause would be satisfied.207 
 
3. Eliminate Notch Effects 
 
All states should make sure no notch effect exists. That is, if a vendor 
has made 199 transactions in a state, the 200th one should not trigger a 
collection obligation on the first 199, especially if there is no practical way 
to collect the tax from the consumer who may be long gone. This is an 
easy drafting problem by simply basing the current year’s collection 
obligation on the prior year’s results (with sufficient rules on short-year 
returns), or, albeit administratively more cumbersome for both taxpayers 
and the tax department, by imposing the collection obligation starting with 
the 200th transaction. Similar rules with respect to the dollar amount of 
sales should parallel these approaches. 
 
4. Retain Existing Rules on Physical Presence in Addition to Post-Wayfair 
Thresholds 
 
I would clarify that any existing physical presence rules are in addition 
to any new post-Wayfair thresholds. If the thresholds were the only test, 
then in-state retailers that were collecting the sales tax pre-Wayfair, might 
inadvertently be stripped of any collection obligation post-Wayfair. 
Similarly, a business with a substantial non-retail physical presence in the 
state, which had been making modest sales into the state from outside the 
state and collecting the use tax pre-Wayfair, should not stop collecting it 
post-Wayfair just because it fell below the threshold.  
Moreover, suppose federal legislation is adopted to overturn Wayfair 
and re-impose the physical presence rule. A state that had kept its pre-
Wayfair rules in place would not need to call a special legislative session 
 
207. Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Minnesota have adopted this approach. See supra Part VII.A. 
Minnesota requires a vendor that meets the gross receipts threshold to have at least 10 sales. 
Consequently, one sale of $100,000 doesn't trigger a collection obligation. Id. California A.B. 147 
would require $500,000 in annual sales into the state by remote sellers or online marketplace 
providers, without regard to the number of transactions. The Assembly Appropriations Committee 
approved the measure on March 6, 2019. 
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to re-adopt its former rules. And there will be open audit years pre-
Wayfair that should be subject to the state’s rules on physical presence. 
It should be emphasized that the South Dakota statute treated remote 
vendors without a physical presence as if they had one.208 Consequently, 
all of the State’s existing rules on what constitutes a physical presence 
remain in place. Wayfair holds that a physical presence is not a necessary 
precondition for nexus, but it remains a sufficient condition if a state 
wishes.  
 
5. Draft the Statute to Impose an Obligation to Collect the Use Tax and 
Not the Sales Tax 
 
Post-Wayfair legislation should avoid a potential problem by clarifying 
that it is the use tax that remote vendors are being asked to collect and not 
the sales tax. Bellas Hess involved the collection of the Illinois use tax.209 
Similarly, Quill involved the collection of the North Dakota use tax.210 The 
South Dakota legislation in Wayfair deviated from these states and 
involved the collection of the sales tax and not the use tax. 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, any seller selling 
tangible personal property, products transferred electronically, or services 
for delivery into South Dakota, who does not have a physical presence in 
the state. . . shall remit the sales tax . . .”211 There is no public explanation 
of why South Dakota drafted its statute this way. 
Distinguished commentators have suggested that the South Dakota 
statute was problematic by requiring remote vendors to collect the state’s 
sales tax rather than its use tax.212 This aspect of the statute conflicted with 
 
208. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089.  
209. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). “The statute requires 
[Bellas Hess] to collect and pay to the appellee Department the tax imposed by Illinois upon 
consumers who purchase the company's goods for use within the State.” Id. (emphasis added). 
210. Quill, 504 U.S. at 298. Justice Stevens stated that Quill, “like National Bellas Hess, involves a 
State's attempt to require an out-of-state mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales 
representatives in the State to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the State.” 
Id. at 301 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). The opinion in Quill did not always respect the 
distinction between sales taxes and use taxes. See, e.g., id. at 314, 316-17, 329. 
211.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2018) (emphasis added). 
212.  Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, & David Gamage, Wayfair: Sales Tax Formalism and 
Income Tax Nexus, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 975 (2018); see Hayes R. Holderness & Matthew C. Boch, 
Did South Dakota Neglect Transactional Nexus in its Bill to Kill Quill?, BLOOMBERG BNA TAX 
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both Quill and McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth.213 They suggest that the 
“uncertainty involving this issue leads us to conclude that the better course 
for states would be to continue to abide by the Dilworth formalism and to 
enact their economic nexus standards through their use tax systems.”214  
Their advice grows out of the companion cases Justice Frankfurter 
authored in 1944: Dilworth and General Trading Co. v. State Tax 
Comm'n.215 Dilworth involved the constitutionality of the imposition of the 
Arkansas sales tax. General Trading involved the constitutionality of the 
collection of the Iowa use tax. Arkansas lost Dilworth; Iowa won General 
Trading.  
The taxpayers in Dilworth were:  
Tennessee corporations with home offices and places of business in 
Memphis where they sell machinery and mill supplies. They are not 
qualified to do business in Arkansas and have neither sales office, 
branch plant nor any other place of business in that State. Orders for 
goods come to Tennessee through solicitation in Arkansas by 
traveling salesmen domiciled in Tennessee, by mail or telephone. 
But no matter how an order is placed it requires acceptance by the 
Memphis office, and on approval the goods are shipped from 
Tennessee. Title passes upon delivery to the carrier in Memphis, 
and collection of the sales price is not made in Arkansas. In short, 
we are here concerned with sales made by Tennessee vendors that 
are consummated in Tennessee for the delivery of goods in 
Arkansas.216  
We would have to destroy both business and legal notions to deny 
that under these circumstances the sale--the transfer of ownership--
was made in Tennessee. For Arkansas to impose a tax on such 
transaction would be to project its powers beyond its boundaries and 
to tax an interstate transaction.217  
 
MGMNT. WKLY. STATE TAX REPORT (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.bna.com/south-dakota-neglect-
n73014472885/. 
213.  322 U.S. 327 (1944); Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, supra note 212. 
214  Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, supra note 212. 
215.  322 U.S. 335 (1944). 
216. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 328. 
217. Id. at 329. 
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There is, however, another aspect to Dilworth. The whole transaction, 
starting with solicitation in Arkansas and ending with the consumer having 
possession of the goods in Arkansas, constituted interstate commerce, 
which, under the jurisprudence of the day, could not be taxed.218 That part 
of the opinion was clearly overturned by subsequent cases.219 But still left 
open is the constitutional definition of where a sale takes place. This issue 
might have been expected to have been refined in subsequent litigation. 
The companion case of General Trading made that unnecessary. 
General Trading involved nearly identical facts to Dilworth. The issue, 
however, was whether the market state (Iowa) could make the remote 
vendor collect its use tax. Iowa was not attempting to make the remote 
vendor collect its sales tax.220 Frankfurter, writing again for the majority, 
upheld the obligation to collect the use tax, and amazingly did not cite the 
companion case of Dilworth. 
Dilworth, by contrast, did allude to General Trading, albeit not by 
name:  
 
It is suggested, however, that Arkansas could have levied a tax of 
the same amount on the use of these goods in Arkansas by the 
 
218. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 328. Jackson, dissenting in General Trading, 
referred to the sale in Dilworth as “being clearly interstate commerce, is not taxable.” Gen. Trading 
Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 336 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson believed so strongly in 
the dormant commerce clause (although that term was not commonly used at that time) that it led him 
to make some outrageous statements about the use tax in Miller Brothers. For example, he stated that 
the Court was “dealing with a relatively new and experimental form of taxation.” This statement may 
have been acceptable in the 1930s, but certainly not in 1954 when the opinion in Miller Brothers was 
issued. States began to adopt general sales and use taxes shortly after the Great Depression began in 
1929. By 1937, more than twenty states had adopted them, and thirty states had general sales and use 
taxes by the time Justice Jackson claimed they were “relatively new” and “experimental.” He also 
referred to the effects of the use tax as a “protective tariff.” If that were actually the proper way to 
view the use tax, it would be unconstitutional. State tariffs are “the quintessential evil targeted by the 
dormant Commerce Clause.” Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
Unfortunately for the accuracy of Jackson’s pronouncement, the Court had already rejected this 
characterization of the use tax in 1937. See Pomp, supra note 64, at 1124-25. 
219. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. See also Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. 
Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). 
220. Compare Gen. Trading Co. 322 U.S. at 336, with Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 327. “The question now 
presented is, in short, whether Iowa may collect, in the circumstances of this case, such a use tax from 
General Trading Company, a Minnesota corporation, on the basis of property bought from Trading 
Company and sent by it from Minnesota to purchasers in Iowa for use and enjoyment there.” Gen. 
Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 336. 
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Arkansas buyers, and that such a use tax would not exceed the 
limits upon state power derived from the United States Constitution. 
Whatever might be the fate of such a tax were it before us,221 the not 
too short answer is that Arkansas has chosen not to impose such a 
use tax, as its Supreme Court so emphatically found. A sales tax and 
a use tax in many instances may bring about the same result. But 
they are different in conception, are assessments upon different 
transactions, and in the interlacings of the two legislative authorities 
within our federation may have to justify themselves on different 
constitutional grounds. A sales tax is a tax on the freedom of 
purchase—a freedom which wartime restrictions serve to 
emphasize. A use tax is a tax on the enjoyment of that which was 
purchased. In view of the differences in the basis of these two taxes 
and the differences in the relation of the taxing state to them, a tax 
on an interstate sale like the one before us and unlike the tax on the 
enjoyment of the goods sold, involves an assumption of power by a 
State which the Commerce Clause was meant to end. The very 
purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade 
among the several States. That clause vested the power of taxing a 
transaction forming an unbroken process of interstate commerce in 
the Congress, not in the States.222 
Although paying a sales tax and collecting a use tax may appear to be a 
formal distinction, Frankfurter did not agree.  
It may help to understand Dilworth by thinking about sales as being 
arrayed on a continuum. At one end are the sales made by an in-state 
retailer to a customer at the store who leaves with the purchased good. 
That this constitutes an in-state sale is beyond constitutional reproach. At 
the other end of the continuum, consider the earlier example of a South 
Dakota tourist on vacation buying more than $200,000 of art at a New 
York City gallery that ships it to South Dakota using a common carrier. 
Dilworth places this situation at the other end of the continuum. Under 
Dilworth, no South Dakota sale exists so how can the gallery owner be 
 
221. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330. This is a bizarre statement because that issue was before the Court in 
the companion case of General Trading, which Frankfurter also authored. See Gen. Trading Co., 322 
U.S. at 336. 
222. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330. 
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asked to pay the South Dakota sales tax as opposed to collecting the South 
Dakota use tax?223 
General Trading presented the market states with a blueprint for 
avoiding the constitutional issue of when a remote vendor can be made to 
collect their sales taxes—and that was to require the collection of their use 
taxes. To be sure, Dilworth did not hold that the Tennessee vendor could 
not be made to collect the Arkansas sales tax (if there were an Arkansas 
sale); it involved only the imposition of a sales tax on a transaction that 
did not constitute a sale in the putative taxing state. It could be viewed as 
having no relevance to determining the constitutionality of a statute 
requiring a vendor to collect a sales tax rather than a use tax. But if 
Dilworth controls on what constitutes a sale, it is hard to imagine how a 
remote vendor using a common carrier is making an in-state sale. 
Frankfurter drew a clear distinction between sales taxes and use taxes. 
The constitutional power to collect a use tax might not automatically 
extend to collecting a sales tax, assuming a sale exists in the taxing state. 
And where a sale takes place in the case of downloaded digital services 
and goods might be problematic. Why invite any challenge at all when the 
Court has already blessed the collection of the use tax in General Trading? 
That case sent a clear unambiguous message, which the states clearly 
understood.  
In addition to the above discussion, a more compelling reason exists 
why a state should draft a statute in terms of collecting a use tax and not a 
sales tax. Recall the earlier example of a South Dakota resident who buys 
more than $200,000 of art in a gallery in New York City, which the 
gallery ships to South Dakota. It is unlikely that this constitutes a South 
Dakota sale under Dilworth. Even though the resident owes a use tax when 
the art arrives home, the gallery would have no obligation under the South 
Dakota statute to collect the sales tax if under Dilworth there were no 
South Dakota sale.224 Redrafting the statute to impose an obligation to 
 
223. It is also possible that the gallery owner cannot be made to collect the South Dakota use because 
of its lack of due process and commerce clause connections. 
224. To keep the problem in focus, assume (unrealistically) that the gallery otherwise has due 
process and commerce clause nexus with South Dakota. To be sure, the distinction between a use tax 
and a sales tax can be described as a “triumph of formalism over substance, ” Complete Auto Transit 
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), and a relic of an era when the Commerce Clause was 
interpreted as protecting an area of tax free trade among the states. Id. at 278. But the substance of the 
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collect the use tax would bring this situation under General Trading and 
be an easy fix avoiding possible litigation.225 
I have no idea why South Dakota drafted its statute in terms of 
collecting the sales tax rather than the use tax. Perhaps there are unique 
South Dakota reasons for doing so. But South Dakota cannot serve as a 
model that should be mimicked on this point.226  
 
VIII. PIKE BALANCING 
 
In many respects, Wayfair was not a surprising decision. Commentators 
had criticized Quill and its physical presence rule almost from the 
outset.227 But one of the more surprising parts of Wayfair was its elevation 
of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,228 a case that was applied in only one tax 
case, into one of the: 
two primary principles that mark the boundaries of a State’s 
authority to regulate interstate commerce. First, state regulations 
may not discriminate against interstate commerce; and second, 
States may not impose undue burdens on interstate commerce. State 
 
transaction in the text is not a South Dakota sale. 
225. Another approach would be a rule that required a remote vendor to collect either the South 
Dakota sales tax or use tax, provided the thresholds were satisfied. 
226. The majority in Wayfair stated that “all concede that taxing the sales in question here is lawful.” 
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087 (emphasis added). I make nothing of this overgeneralization. Neither party, 
nor any of the amici addressed the issue discussed in the text. I cannot believe that the Court was even 
aware of Dilworth, let alone was implicitly overruling it. See Holderness & Boch, supra note 212 (“By 
limiting the scope of the new economic nexus rule to sales taxes, South Dakota has put up an 
additional hurdle in the way of the victory it deserves. The state may find that even if it wins on the 
physical presence issue, it will remain unable to tax the proceeds from sales of products delivered into 
the state by common carrier, and additional legislation will be necessary.”) Holderness and Boch 
dissect possible South Dakota arguments that a remote vendor can be made to pay the sales tax and 
find all of them defective. Id. See also Thimmesch, Shanske, & Gamage, supra note 212. (“Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy’s opinion explicitly noted that the South Dakota statute imposed a sales tax 
collection obligation, but the reference seems to have been more colloquial than technical.”). 
 Winning on a Dilworth argument would only stall the inevitable litigation because of the ease 
with which a state could cure the defect by redrafting. Also, because the use tax would be owed by the 
purchaser regardless of such litigation, even a winning litigant would not necessarily recover any sales 
taxes that it might have already paid. 
227. See the articles set forth in POMP, supra note 28, at 9-82-9-83. Some did leave the oral argument, 
however, surprised at what they perceived to be the hostile questioning of South Dakota and the 
government. 
228. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
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laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face ‘a virtually 
per se rule of invalidity’ . . . State laws that ‘regulat[e] even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest . . . will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’ Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970); see also Southern Pacific 
[325 U.S., at 779].229 Although subject to exceptions and variations . 
. . these two principles guide the courts in adjudicating cases 
challenging state laws under the Commerce Clause.230  
Moreover, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. did not figure prominently even 
in the one state tax case in which it was mentioned. For that reason, a 
detailed review of the case is in order.  
Bruce Church engaged in commercial farming in Arizona and 
California. Pike was an Arizona official charged with enforcing the 
Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act, which was interpreted to 
require that cantaloupes grown in Arizona for sale had to be packaged in 
crates within Arizona. Accordingly, Pike prohibited Bruce Church from 
transporting uncrated cantaloupes from its Arizona ranch to California for 
packing and processing.231 Apparently, cantaloupes packed in Arizona 
were labeled as coming from Arizona and similarly, cantaloupes packed in 
California were labeled as coming from California.232 
The company spent more than $3 million preparing its Arizona ranch 
for growing cantaloupes. Its packing plant in California was 31 miles from 
 
229. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) preceded Pike by 25 years. 
That case involved Arizona’s limit on the length of trains. The Court applied a balancing test similar to 
what would subsequently be articulated in Pike. The Court acknowledged that its dormant commerce 
clause approach must consider the “relative weights of the state and national interests involved.” Id. at 
770. The Court had an easy time striking down the Arizona law finding that it imposed a serious 
burden on interstate commerce and that it had “no reasonable relation to safety,” and actually “made 
train operation more dangerous.” Id. at 775. The Court had little trouble concluding that the Arizona 
law achieved “at most a slight and dubious” safety benefit while “preventing the free flow of 
commerce by delaying it and by substantially increasing its cost and impairing its efficiency.” Id. at 
779. 
230. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091. 
231. Pike, 397 U.S. at 138. 
232. The Court proceeded on this assumption, but it is not clear whether the labeling was required by 
Arizona law or simply represented the industry practice. Accord Donald Regan, The Supreme Court 
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 
1209-10 (1986). 
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its Arizona ranch. It would have cost Bruce Church $200,000 to build a 
packaging facility in Arizona and while it was being built the company 
would have lost $700,000 in unsold cantaloupes.233  
In holding that the Arizona statute imposed an unconstitutional burden 
on interstate commerce, the Court stated that: 
[a]lthough the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes 
affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the 
general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the 
statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effect on interstate commerce are only incidental, it 
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. . . If a 
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of 
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of 
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on 
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on 
interstate activities. Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken 
a balancing approach in resolving these issues, Southern Pacific Co. 
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, but more frequently it has spoken in terms 
of “direct” and “indirect” effects and burdens.234 
 
In applying this test, the Court had the benefit of the State having 
stipulated that the primary purpose of the law was to promote and preserve 
the reputation of Arizona growers by prohibiting deceptive packaging,235 
which the Court admitted were legitimate, but not strong state interests.  
But the State's tenuous interest in having the company's cantaloupes 
identified as originating in Arizona cannot constitutionally justify the 
requirement that the company build and operate an unneeded $200,000 
packing plant in the State. The nature of that burden is, constitutionally, 
more significant than its extent.236 For the Court has viewed with 
 
233. Pike, 397 U.S. at 139. 
234. Id. at 142. 
235. Id. at 143. Apparently, Arizona grew especially good cantaloupes and the purpose of the law 
was to enhance the competitiveness of the State’s cantaloupe growers.  
236. Regan, supra note 232, at 1215:  
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particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be 
performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed 
elsewhere.237 Even where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local 
interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be 
virtually per se illegal.238  
The Arizona “regulatory scheme could perhaps be tolerated if a more 
compelling state interest were involved” but “the State’s interest is 
minimal at best. . . ”239 
What the Court does not do, contrary to its own formulation of its 
balancing test, is to ask whether there were alternatives that would have 
less impact on interstate commerce. The most obvious alternative would 
be a law requiring cantaloupes grown in Arizona to have a sticker affixed 
to them indicating their origin; it would be irrelevant where the sticker was 
applied. Would the cost of affixing that sticker at Church’s California 
plant be so different from the costs of affixing that sticker in Arizona? 
Without knowing more, it would seem that the mechanics and hence cost 
of placing a sticker on a cantaloupe would not be a function of where the 
sticker was applied. The Court is remarkably silent on raising this 
alternative. 
Nor is it clear why the Arizona law should be viewed as “even handed.” 
Church is prohibited from processing his Arizona-grown cantaloupes in 
California. In the context of the Commerce Clause, why is that “even 
handed”? According to Professor Coenen, “Pike itself presented an odd 
case in which to set forth a standard for assessing neutral rules because it 
involved the application of a state statute that, under present-day analysis, 
appeared to entail overt discrimination.”240 “From a present-day vantage 
 
The first sentence, which concludes with a reference to the $200,000 cost to Bruce Church, 
could be the start of an open-ended private interest balancing. But we are told in the next 
sentence that the nature of the burden is more significant than its extent. Already then, the 
balancing is not simply a matter of totting up costs and benefits. Some costs are special. 
Incidentally, the famous Pike test from earlier in Stewart’s opinion says nothing about the 
nature of the burden being significant. It says the nature of the local interest is significant, but 
not the nature of the burden.  
237. See infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
238. Pike, 397 U.S. at 145. 
239. Id. at 146. 
240. DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 266 (2004). 
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point, the operation of the Arizona law thus seemed to discriminate against 
interstate commerce by imposing an in-state processing requirement on the 
grower.”241 Professor Regan reaches the same result as Professor Coenen 
by characterizing the Arizona law as “protectionist” and equivalent to an 
“embargo.”242 After an exhaustive, rigorous disembowelment of the 
decision, Professor Regan concludes that Pike is not a balancing opinion at 
all despite professing to be one.243  
Indeed, the Court’s reference to the State’s burden being “virtually per 
se illegal” is language normally applied to facially discriminatory statutes 
and is the opposite of balancing.244 That is the way Wayfair referred to the 
term.245 So what to make of Pike’s elevation? 
Perhaps the way to appreciate Pike is to recognize that at least since 
1951, the Court had struck down state laws that imposed an “undue 
burden” on interstate commerce.246 Pike seems to have been a reaction to 
this earlier line of cases that suggested that a statute that rationally served 
a legitimate state interest in a non-discriminatory manner was 
constitutional regardless of its burden on interstate commerce.247 Pike 
rejects that proposition. 
Predictably, terms like “burden” and “undue” are as opaque as they are 
rootless and flexible. Consistent with Pike’s low profile in state tax cases, 
Quill referred to “undue burdens” without even citing Pike.248 “Their 
 
241. Id. at 266 n.41. 
242. Regan, supra note 232, at 1220.  
243. Id. 
244. See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996).  
245. “State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face ‘a virtually per se rule of 
invalidity.’” Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018). 
246. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353 (1951). The term “undue burden” or 
some variation thereof has been used by litigants or the Supreme Court starting in the early 20th 
century. See, e.g., Union Tank Line v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 279 (1919); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 
U.S. 495, 521 (1922), Pac. Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 297 U.S. 403, 413 (1936).  
247. See, e.g., South Carolina Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). Eleven years 
before Pike, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959), rejected Barnwell’s proposition that 
“no showing of burden on interstate commerce is sufficient to invalidate local safety regulations in 
absence of some element of discrimination against interstate commerce.” Id. at 528-29. In its place, 
Bibb adopted a balancing test that anticipated Pike. Inexplicably, Pike does not cite Bibb. In Raymond 
Motor Transportation v. Rice, the Court applied Pike and stated that “we cannot accept the State’s 
contention that the inquiry under the Commerce Clause is ended without a weighing of the asserted 
safety purpose against the degree of interference with interstate commerce.” Raymond Motor Transp. 
v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978).  
248. The closest Quill came to citing Pike was its citing of Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways 
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application thus requires courts to make tough contextual judgments as 
they work their way through an endless stream of cases involving every 
imaginable form of state law.”249 If Pike was intended to avoid these 
problems, it simply replaced terms like “undue” and “burden” with an 
equally opaque balancing test requiring determinations regarding whether 
a “burden” is “clearly excessive” in relation to “putative local benefits” 
and whether a statute regulates “evenhandedly” to effectuate a 
“legitimate” local “public interest”. Each of the preceding terms in quotes 
is hardly self-defining and will take their meaning from the context of a 
case, requiring a robust record. Pike did little to imbue these terms with 
any meaning that might guide future cases, which the Court lamented in 
Davis v. Kentucky, discussed below.  
Pike has been applied in only one tax case; its recent application in non-
tax cases has resulted in state victories.250 The only state tax case 
discussing Pike was Kentucky v. Davis,251 which dealt with Kentucky’s 
personal income tax exemption for interest received by residents from 
Kentucky bonds while taxing residents on interest received from out-of-
state bonds. The Davises attacked this provision as discriminating against 
interstate commerce.  
Unfortunately for the Davises, their timing could not have been worse. 
The case was heard in the middle of the country’s financial crisis,252 and 
 
Corp., which in turn cited Pike. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992). But Quill never 
explicitly referred to Pike or engaged in a balancing test. Wayfair described the Quill majority as 
“conclud[ing] that the physical presence rule was necessary to prevent undue burdens on interstate 
commerce.” Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092.  
249. COENEN, supra note 240, at 210. 
250. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmnt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 
(2007); Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 493 (1989). But see Edgar v. 
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). Adam Thimmesch, A Unifying Approach to Nexus Under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, MICH. L. REV. ONLINE (2018), reprinted in POMP, supra note 28, at 9-
117 (“The Court has not struck down a state statute applying [Pike] balancing since the 1980’s. The 
Roberts Court has generally been unwilling to even engage in balancing.”). 
251. 553 U.S. 328 (2007). Professor Coenen argues that “there was a strong reason not to apply Pike 
balancing in Davis because that case involved a challenged tax law, rather than a challenged 
regulation, and the Court has historically not subjected state tax laws to Pike-balancing analysis. . . 
The Davis Court noted, however, that all parties in Davis had seen fit to evaluate the Kentucky tax rule 
under Pike, and for this reason [the Court] proceeded to do so as well.” Dan T. Coenen, The Supreme 
Court’s Municipal Bond Decision and the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1179, 1206 n.136 (2009).  
252. The case was argued November 5, 2007; the opinion was issued May 19, 2008. The financial 
crisis started in the summer of 2007, with the collapse of the collateralized debt obligation market. See, 
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involved a hoary feature found in nearly every state’s personal income 
tax.253 Presumably, a victory for the taxpayers would have disrupted the 
bond market, fueled the melt-down of the financial markets, and undercut 
the reliance interest of those who would not have bought state bonds 
except for the exemption.254 Hence, it was not surprising that the Court 
upheld the exemption and provided stability to the bond market.255 
Almost from the opening few pages in the decision, it was apparent the 
exemption would be upheld. The Court’s historical review early in its 
opinion emphasized that for nearly two centuries, states and their political 
subdivisions have issued bonds to finance projects256 and that for nearly a 
century, states have adopted income tax exemptions similar to Kentucky’s.  
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, which 
found the tax scheme to be facially unconstitutional.257 The Court based its 
reversal on United Haulers,258 which held just a year earlier as described 
by Davis that “a government function is not susceptible to standard 
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny [because of] its likely motivation by 
legitimate objectives distinct from the simple economic protectionism the 
Clause abhors.”259 “[T]he issuance of debt securities to pay for public 
projects is a quintessentially public function, with [a] venerable history. . 
.”260 The Court characterized the State’s taxing regime as “parallel[ing] the 
ordinance[s] upheld in United Haulers”261 and thus beyond dormant 
commerce clause scrutiny. 
 
e.g., Global Financial Crisis: Five Key Stages, THE GUARDIAN, 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/ 
2011/aug/07/global-financial-crisis-key-stages (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). 
253. Forty-nine states filed briefs in support of Kentucky. Davis, 553 U.S. at 342. Justice Kennedy in 
dissent quipped that “[p]rotectionist interests always want the laws they pass . . . ” Id. at 373 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
254. The Court focused not on the buyers but on the “settled expectations” of the states.  
255. The Court did not rule on the special state tax treatment of private activity bonds, but 
presumably the holding in the case would be extended to that subset of the bond market. Private 
activity bonds are municipal bonds issued by a state on behalf of a private entity serving the public 
good, such as an airport, hospital, or low-income housing. The Davises did not pursue this issue at 
trial.  
256. Id. at 331 (majority opinion). 
257. The Kentucky Supreme Court refused to review the Court of Appeals decision. Id. at 337. 
258. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007). 
259. 553 U.S. at 341. 
260. Id. at 342. 
261. Id. at 343.  
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Because of the importance that Wayfair places on Pike balancing, and 
its prior unimportance in state taxation, it is worth quoting at length from 
the majority’s treatment of Pike. 
“The Davises' request for Pike balancing assumes an answer to an open 
question: whether Pike even applies to a case of this sort. . . We need not 
decide this question today, however, for Kentucky has not argued that Pike 
is irrelevant, and even on the assumption that a Pike examination might 
generally be in order in this type of case, the current record and scholarly 
material convince us that the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to 
draw reliable conclusions of the kind that would be necessary for the 
Davises to satisfy a Pike burden in this particular case.  
The institutional difficulty is manifest in the very train of disadvantages 
that the Davises' counsel attributes to the current differential tax scheme:  
 
First, it harms out-of-state issuers (i.e., other States and their 
subdivisions) by blocking their access to investment dollars in 
Kentucky. Second, it similarly harms out-of-state private sellers 
(e.g., underwriters, individuals, and investment funds) who wish to 
sell their bonds in Kentucky. Third, it harms the national municipal 
bond market and its participants by distorting and impeding the free 
flow of capital. Fourth, it harms Kentucky investors by promoting 
risky, high-cost investment vehicles. Fifth, it harms the States by 
compelling them to enact competing discriminatory laws that 
decrease their net revenues. 
Even if each of these drawbacks does to some degree eventuate 
from the system, it must be apparent to anyone that weighing or 
quantifying them for a cost-benefit analysis would be a very subtle 
exercise. It is striking, after all, that most of the harms allegedly 
flowing directly or indirectly to Kentucky's sister States and their 
citizens have failed to dissuade even a single State from supporting 
the current system; every one of them, including States with no 
income tax, have lined up with Kentucky in this case.  
The prospect for reliable Pike comparison dims even further when 
we turn to the benign function of the current system flagged a 
moment ago. Is any court in a position to evaluate the advantage of 
the current market for bonds issued by the smaller municipalities, 
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the ones with no ready access to any other bond market than single-
state funds? Consider that any attempt to place a definite value on 
this feature of the existing system would have to confront the what-
if questions. If termination of the differential tax scheme 
jeopardized or eliminated most single-state funds (as the cited 
authorities predict) would some new source of capital take their 
place? Would the interstate markets accommodate the small issuers 
(as no cited authorities predict), or would the financing in question 
be replaced by current local taxation for long-term projects 
(unlikely, considering that financially weaker borrowers are 
involved), or would state governments assume responsibility 
through their own bonds or by state taxation? Or would capital to 
some degree simply dry up, eliminating a class of municipal 
improvements? And if some new source or sources of capital 
became available for these improvements in a given State, how 
likely is it that the new scheme would produce measurable net 
benefits to other States seeking capital, and how perceptibly would 
it produce a freer flow of funds? Money spent up front on increased 
local or state taxation is no more available for out-of-state 
investment than money invested in local bonds; sinking funds 
would be obviated, but what would the effect be on interstate capital 
flows?  
What is most significant about these cost-benefit questions is not 
even the difficulty of answering them or the inevitable uncertainty 
of the predictions that might be made in trying to come up with 
answers, but the unsuitability of the judicial process and judicial 
forums for making whatever predictions and reaching whatever 
answers are possible at all. . . . 
While it is not our business to suggest that the current system be 
reconsidered, if it is to be placed in question a congressional forum 
has two advantages. Congress has some hope of acquiring more 
complete information than adversary trials may produce, and an 
elected legislature is the preferable institution for incurring the 
economic risks of any alteration in the way things have traditionally 
been done. And risk is the essence of what the Davises are urging 
here. It would miss the mark to think that the Kentucky courts, and 
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ultimately this Court, are being invited merely to tinker with details 
of a tax scheme; we are being asked to apply a federal rule to throw 
out the system of financing municipal improvements throughout 
most of the United States, and the rule in Pike was never intended to 
authorize a court to expose the States to the uncertainties of the 
economic experimentation the Davises request.262  
Not exactly a glowing endorsement of Pike. Justice Scalia did not join 
the majority’s discussion of Pike because it did not go far enough. He 
would abandon Pike in its entirety: 
The Court declines to engage in Pike balancing here because courts 
are ill suited to determining whether or not this law imposes 
burdens on interstate commerce that clearly outweigh the law's local 
benefits, and the "balancing" should therefore be left to Congress. . . 
The problem is that courts are less well suited than Congress to 
perform this kind of balancing in every case. The burdens and the 
benefits are always incommensurate and cannot be placed on the 
opposite balances of a scale without assigning a policy-based 
weight to each of them. It is a matter not of weighing apples against 
apples, but of deciding whether three apples are better than six 
tangerines.263 Here, on one end of the scale (the burden side) there 
 
262. 553 U.S. at 353-57. Professor Thimmesch identifies the difficulty of measuring a state’s interest 
in levying taxes under a Pike balancing. Thimmesch, supra note 250. 
263. 553 U.S. at 360 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Justice Scalia had earlier indicated his scorn for 
balancing as “more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” 
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)(Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). See generally Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much—An Examination of 
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47 (1981). Justice Black thought that courts 
should overrule only discriminatory laws. J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 330 (1938) 
(Black, J., dissenting). Otherwise, the courts would sit as a “super-legislature.” Southern Pac. Co. v. 
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 788 (1945). One response to the Black position is that 
[d]iscrimination is a delusively simple term. How overreaching must a state measure be to 
merit condemnation as discriminatory? It seems apparent that in answering this question the 
Court must make the same sort of value judgment that it has been making in performing its 
broader protective function. Discrimination exist or not, depending upon whether there is an 
economic justification for the difference in treatment which the state accords interstate 
commerce. 
Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power—Revised Version, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 1938-1962 280, 290 (1963). 
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rests a certain degree of suppression of interstate competition in 
borrowing; and on the other (the benefits side) a certain degree of 
facilitation of municipal borrowing. Of course, you cannot decide 
which interest ‘outweigh’ the other without deciding which interest 
is more important to you. And that will always be the case. I would 
abandon the Pike-balancing enterprise altogether and leave these 
quintessentially legislative judgments with the branch to which the 
Constitution assigns them.264 
Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by Justice Alito. Given Kennedy's 
emphasis on Pike in Wayfair, his cursory treatment of Pike in Davis is 
particularly noteworthy. Kennedy simply agreed that Pike did not have to 
be addressed because the Kentucky tax regime was unconstitutional under 
a different line of cases.265 That was it. Not the resounding affirmation of 
Pike that Kennedy expressed in Wayfair.  
So, what accounted for the Court’s exuberance for Pike balancing in 
Wayfair given its subdued reception in Davis? Presumably, it was 
attributable to the Government’s suggestion in Wayfair that Pike “can 
protect against any undue burden on interstate commerce, taking into 
consideration the small businesses, startups, or others who engage in 
commerce across state lines. For example, the United States argues that 
tax-collection requirements should be analyzed under the balancing 
framework of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.”266 Was it just an easy way out of 
having to deal with tough questions that were not formally before the 
Court? 
What type of situation might raise a Pike balancing test? Perhaps one 
involving the collection of a local sales tax in State X, whose local sales 
taxes do not conform with X’s State sales tax. Suppose State X adopts the 
same sales and transaction thresholds as in South Dakota’s law. Assume 
the base of X’s local sales taxes differs markedly from the base of the 
State’s sales tax. The local base is much broader and has fewer exemptions 
than the State’s.267 Furthermore, these local taxes are locally administered 
 
264. Davis, 553 U.S. at 360 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
265. Id. at 365 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
266. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098-99. 
267. For example, compare LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:305(D)(1)(j) (state exemption for prescription 
drugs) with New Orleans Code of Ordinances § 150-887 (prescription drugs taxable); compare LA. 
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and differ from each other. In addition, X takes the position that if a 
remote vendor exceeds the State thresholds it has to collect the local taxes 
even if its sales into those localities are below the thresholds.268 
Suppose a remote vendor exceeds the State’s thresholds but makes a 
very modest amount of sales into a locality. Suppose it can prove that its 
profit margin on those sales is de minimis compared to its costs of 
complying with the local tax.269 I leave it to the reader to ponder how Pike 
would resolve this case.270 Such suits would not result in a refund because 
the use tax would be owed by the consumer, but it would result in being 
freed from onerous compliance burdens. 
 
IX. LOCAL SALES TAXES, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE 
INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT 
It is tempting for a state having local sales taxes to require a remote 
vendor to collect a local use tax based on the delivery address because that 
is obviously known to the vendor and easily audited. It is also tempting for 
 
STAT. ANN. § 47:305(D)(1)(n) (state exemption for food) with Caddo Parish Code of Ordinances § 50-
26 (food taxable); LA. STATE. ANN. § 47:305(D)(1)(m) (state exemption for patient aids) with Caddo 
Parish Code of Ordinances § 50-26 (patient aids taxable) LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, § 4301 (exemption 
for custom computer software) with Caddo Parish Code of Ordinances § 50-26 (custom software 
taxable).  
 Another candidate for an attack under Pike would be Colorado, which has 71 municipalities 
having their own registration and filing requirements, and tax bases, which not only differ from the 
state’s but also from each other. There are 60 local tax rates and 34 various tax districts. “[A] Colorado 
retailer can face up to 756 sales tax combinations.” Bruce Nelson, Wayfair—A Cover for Other 
Mischief?, 91 STATE TAX NOTES 221, 221 (2019). Another commentator observes that Colorado has 
over 300 local taxing jurisdictions—counties, cities, and other various special tax districts, in addition 
to 69 home rule jurisdictions. Bland, supra note 176. 
268. See generally Walter Hellerstein, Are State and Local Taxes Constitutionally Distinguishable, 
83 STATE TAX NOTES 1091 (2017). South Dakota has no local sales or use taxes, so this issue was not 
presented by Wayfair. 
269. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 18-114, SALES TAX: STATES COULD GAIN REVENUE 
FROM EXPANDED AUTHORITY BUT BUSINESSES ARE LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE COMPLIANCE COSTS 15-
27 (2018), lists compliance cost as including the time spent on making sure taxes are correctly paid, 
the cost of purchasing software and the computing resources needed to incorporate and run tax 
compliance software, and the time and cost of dealing with audits. 
270. For some suggestions on how the analysis might proceed, see Hayes Holderness, The 
Workability of Pike Balancing for State and Local Tax Collection Obligations, THE SURLY SUBGROUP 
(Apr. 4, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/W752-J4AE, reprinted in POMP, supra note 28, at 9-113; 
Jeffrey S. Reed, What Is the New Constitutional Test After Wayfair?, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 335 
(2018), reprinted in POMP, supra note 28, at 9-114; Thimmesch, supra note 250. 
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a state to require local retailers to collect a local sales or use tax at the 
local rate that applies at the location of the retailer, even if the customer 
has those goods shipped to an address in another location in the state. This 
way the local retailer only has to master one set of local rules and 
regulations. This difference in rules, however, leads to both a 
constitutional problem and a violation of the Internet Tax Freedom Act.271  
Arizona provides an example. Arizona provides different sourcing rules 
for remote vendors and in-state vendors.272 A sale by an in-state retailer is 
sourced to the “seller's business location if the seller receives the order at a 
business location in this state,”273 regardless of where shipped. By 
comparison, a sale by a remote vendor is sourced “to the purchaser's 
location in this state if the seller receives the order at a business location 
outside this state,” regardless of where that person resides.  
To illustrate, suppose a resident of local Jurisdiction X shops at a store in 
local Jurisdiction Y and has the purchase shipped back to X. The local 
sales tax will be based on rates in Y. If that same person were to order 
over the Internet, however, the remote vendor would charge tax based on 
rates in X. This discrimination in rates has been held to be 
unconstitutional.274 In addition, this discrimination would violate the 
Internet Tax Freedom Act.275 
 
271.  Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title XI, 112 Stat. 2681, 2719 (1998) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 
151). 
272. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-5040 (2018). Sourcing of certain transactions involving tangible 
personal property; definitions 
A. Except as provided in section 42-5075, retail sales of tangible personal property shall be sourced as 
follows: 
1. To the seller's business location if the seller receives the order at a business location in this state. 
2. Except as provided in section 42-5008.01, to the purchaser's location in this state if the seller 
receives the order at a business location outside this state. 
B. For the purposes of this section, an order is received when all of the information necessary to accept 
the order has been received by or on behalf of the seller, regardless of where the order is accepted or 
approved. The place of business or residence of the purchaser does not determine where the order is 
received. 
273. Id. 
274.  Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994). 
275.  47 U.S.C. § 151 (2018). See POMP, supra note 28, at 8-33-41. Section 1105(2) defines a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol58/iss1/7
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The difference in compliance burdens alone would raise a Pike balancing 
issue even if no discrimination were found. The remote vendor has to deal 
with 91 different municipal tax codes and 15 county rates. Each municipal 
tax code differs from the State’s and from the others. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
It will be years before we have a feel for Wayfair’s implications and its 
fallout. Short-term predictions are safer. Starting with the safest, the states 
will continue adopting legislation modeled after South Dakota’s. 
Hopefully, the statutes will refer to the collection of the use tax and not the 
sales tax. Moreover, rather than treating the sales and transaction tests as 
alternatives, both might be required to be satisfied as in Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York. Alternatively, a state might 
consider dropping the transaction test. Although Wayfair endorsed the 
Streamlined Sales Tax Agreement, the politics will discourage the states 
from rushing to join. 
As time goes on, the states may be forced to adopt anti-avoidance 
statutes aggregating related entities for purposes of satisfying the 
thresholds. Similarly, refinements in the definition of a “transaction” 
might be expected. The Court’s recent due process cases will become 
more important in testing particular fact patterns. 
There will be renewed interest in Pike balancing, which has previously 
played no significant role in state taxation. I am somewhat skeptical that 
the doctrine can bear the weight that will now be placed on it or how it 
will be distinguished from just plain old “undue burdens.” 
The most likely litigation will take place at the municipal level, dealing 
with discrimination, undue burdens on interstate commerce, and violations 
of the Internet Tax Freedom Act. 
The good news is that the fear of off-shore vendors ignoring Wayfair is 
 
discriminatory tax as meaning (A) any tax imposed by a State or political subdivision thereof on 
electronic commerce that–(i) is not generally imposed and legally collectible by such State or such 
political subdivision on transactions involving similar property, goods, services, or information 
accomplished through other means; (ii) is not generally imposed and legally collectible at the same 
rate by such State or such political subdivision on transactions involving similar property, goods, 
services . . .” see also Performance Mktg. Ass'n v. Hamer, 998 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. 2013). 
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probably over blown.  
While the Court missed an opportunity to inter “substantial nexus,” I 
look forward to the day when the phrase is recognized as unhinged and 
politically driven—and buried. 
All bets will be off, of course, should Congress overturn Wayfair and 
reinstate the physical presence requirement. The fact that Congress did 
nothing in the 26 years between Quill and Wayfair is not predictive 
because the politics post-Wayfair are 180 degrees different from the pre-
Wayfair era. 
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